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Abstract
The accelerating cost of healthcare in the United States has prompted increased policy
debate. Although it is estimated that prescription drug spending accounts for only eleven
percent of total healthcare expenditures, there is evidence that this rate of spending is
increasing faster than spending on other types of healthcare. A proven method of de-
creasing prescription drug spending is by using less expensive generic medications when
available. We estimate the price elasticities of switching from branded to generic drugs in
three dominant drug classes: antidepressants, statins, and central nervous system agents.
We find the price elasticities of switching varies by drug and is between 0.01 and 0.09.
Despite long-standing use of mandatory generic substitution laws, their exact effect on
generic fill-rate and prescription drug spending has not been identified. We use the Ten-
nessee Affordable Drug Act of 2005 to identify the effect of implementing the mandatory
generic substitution of drugs by pharmacists. Using a differences-in-differences framework,
we estimate the effect of this policy on the percentage of generic drugs dispensed in the
state of Tennessee. We find the effect to vary across drug classes and health insurance
types, with the greatest effect occurring within Point of Service insurance plans among
non-chronic prescription drug users.
We propose extensions to the technology acceptance model (TAM) for the adoption of
integrated electronic health records that are shared by multiple healthcare providers. In
particular, we propose a conceptual model in which we incorporate two new factors—trust
and access to shared information—into the TAM. We find a statistically significant effect
of shared information on perceived usefulness. We also find a significant effect of trust on
both perceived usefulness and behavioral intent to use integrated electronic health records.
Our analysis provides insights into the effects of these factors on intent to use integrated
1
electronic health records for both clinical and non-clinical staff.
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Chapter 1
Identifying the Price Elasticity of
Switching Between Branded and
Generic Drugs
1.1 Introduction
Understanding the consumer response to generic introductions of prescription drugs is
critically important to policy makers and insurance plan managers because healthcare
costs can be reduced significantly through the use of less expensive generic medications.
The absence of studies that analyze consumer purchasing behavior of prescription drugs
immediately following the loss of patent exclusivity warrants attention. Current studies
focus on the influence of insurance plan design, copayment structure, and formulary struc-
ture on prescription drug choice and subsequent costs. We expand upon this research by
identifying the sensitivity of consumer adoption of generic drugs to differences between
the cost of the generic and branded drugs. Additionally, we determine the impact of the
3
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branded average wholesale price (AWP) on switching. We analyze the switching behav-
ior in three large drug classes that experienced generic introductions during our sample
period. These prescription drug classes include the introduction of: the first generic Se-
lective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs), Fluoxetine; one of the first large generic
introductions in the statin class, Simvastatin; and the first generic gamma-aminobutyric
acid, Gabapentin.
We analyze these prescription drugs because of their widespread use and high branded
costs that promise a substantial cost-savings from significant generic uptake. The use of
antidepressants increased by 74 percent in the first five years of the 1990s, with much of this
increase attributed to the addition of SSRIs to the antidepressant drug class [Sleath and
Shih, 2002]. In 2000, the year before the introduction of Fluoxetine, Prozac accounted
for the fourth-highest level of prescription drug expenditures in the United States. At
that time, there existed over 3.4 million individual prescriptions for Prozac, accounting
for approximately $2 billion in expenditures [AHRQ, 2000]. Similarly, the use of statins
has increased dramatically during this time period. In 2005, Lipitor and Zocor ranked
first and second in prescribed drugs by total expenditures, accounting for $9.3 billion and
$5.7 billion in sales, respectively. Both drugs ranked in the top ten for total purchases that
year, and Zocor was the largest drug (by sales volume) to lose patent protection in 2006
[Smith, 2005]. In 2005, immediately following the introduction of Gabapentin, the generic
form of Neurontin, central nervous system agents ranked second-highest in individual
prescriptions, with 76.9 million users. When considering expenditures by therapeutic
drug class, this class ranked third with $24.5 billion in spending [AHRQ, 2005].
A principle incentive for switching to a generic drug is to reduce one’s out-of-pocket
(OOP) drug expenditures. We construct a variable that measures the difference in OOP
cost between the branded and generic drug to assess how price-sensitive individuals are
4
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to OOP cost changes. Additionally, an individual may switch to a generic drug based
on a physician’s recommendation or inducements from insurance plans or pharmacists
[Coscelli, 2000]. In order to determine the potential impact of these pathways, we use the
third-party-payer (TPP) cost differential (CD) between the branded and generic drug, and
the AWP of the branded drug when the generic becomes available. Using these metrics,
we estimate three sets of price elasticities for each drug class. These estimates can be used
to adjust tiered cost sharing schedules in order to induce consumers to switch to generic
drugs, thereby reducing prescription drug costs for both private and public payers.
Our study extends the literature by specifically identifying the price elasticity of switch-
ing within the antidepressant, statin, and anticonvulsant therapeutic drug classes. Further,
we incorporate fixed effects to limit potential omitted variable bias caused by patient se-
lection. This paper proceeds in the following manner: Section 1.2 reviews the previous
literature focusing on the pathways influencing switching behavior; Section 1.3 identifies
our empirical approach; Section 1.4 follows with details of the data used in the analysis;
Section 1.5 provides the results of our study; and Section 1.6 concludes our paper.
1.2 Background and Literature Review
In order to analyze the switching behavior between drug choices, one must understand
the factors that influence a patient’s prescription drug decision. Prescription decisions
are a combination of patient and physician preferences. Pharmacists may also influence
the prescription drug a patient receives because of state laws governing how generic drugs
are dispensed. We are interested in determining the effect of a change in price on a
patients’ switching decision; therefore, we must control for these non-price mechanisms
that contribute to switching.
5
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Price sensitivity and quality determine patient drug preference [Dubois et al., 2000].
The price that patients pay for each drug is dependent upon their insurance plan and
corresponding prescription drug benefit structure (also known as a drug formulary). In
the market for prescription drugs, Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs), rather than health
insurance companies per se determine prescription drug benefits; in 1999, approximately 70
percent of insurance companies contracted with PBMs to provide these benefits to enrollees
[Frank, 2001]. PBMs negotiate prescription drug prices directly with manufacturers, who
charge the PBM a price based on volume discounts, rebates, and formulary structure. The
PBM subsequently charges the insurance company, who passes on some portion of those
costs to patients through copayments and coinsurance. In copayment drug formularies, a
generic drug will usually have the lowest copayment, followed by a higher copayment for
a preferred branded drug; the highest copayment is for a non-preferred-branded drug. In
coinsurance formularies, the coinsurance rate is often constant for all types of prescription
drugs [Frank 2001].
In the early 1970s, the RAND Health Insurance Experience (HIE) was the first study
to analyze the effect of cost sharing on prescription drug usage. The RAND analysis
concluded that patients who were required to pay a larger percentage of their prescription
drug costs spent a lower amount on prescription drugs than did their peers. Further,
the authors determined that this decreased expenditure occurred through the fulfillment
of fewer prescriptions, not by individuals purchasing lower-cost (generic) prescriptions
[Leibowitz et al., 1985].
As analysis continued over the next few decades, the relationship between cost shar-
ing and level of usage became a prominent research topic. These studies varied across
populations and insurance plan types, and included the Medicaid population [Reeder and
Nelson, 1985; Soumerai et al., 1987], the Medicare population [Maio et al., 2005], and the
6
1.2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
privately insured [Joyce et al., 2005; Mager and Cox, 2007; Huskamp et al., 2003; Druss
et al., 2004]; all confirmed the original finding from the RAND HIE that increased cost
sharing decreases spending.
Despite consistent findings that prescription drug demand is sensitive to price increases,
disagreement emerges in regard to how the decreased spending occurs. Gibson et al.
(2006) find results consistent with the RAND study that higher copayments are associated
with decreased drug adherence, not the use of less-costly drugs. In contrast, Mager and
Cox (2007) find that a larger generic-to-branded copayment differential decreases costs by
increasing the probability of generic prescription-fills. Huskamp et al. (2003) find that
changes in cost structure cause some patients to use cheaper drug therapies, while other
patients discontinue their use.
Due to endogeneity concerns regarding patient selection into insurance plans, identifying
an unbiased price elasticity estimate for prescription drugs remains a difficult empirical
task. There are very few studies that identify the impact of price changes on drug de-
mand while accounting for patient selection into drug insurance. Recent examples include
Meyerhoefer and Zuvekas (2010), who use panel data methods for this purpose, and Con-
toyannis et al. (2005), who use a natural experiment. Contoyannis et al. (2005) identify
the price elasticity for prescription drug expenditure to be between 0.12 and 0.16, while
estimates from Meyerhoefer and Zuvekas (2010) are 0.61 for mental health drugs and 0.31
for drugs used to treat all other conditions.
Quality is another factor that influences patient preference for prescription drugs [Rizzo
and Zeckhauser, 2009], and patients may consider branded drugs to be of higher quality
than their generic equivalents. Dubois et al. (2000) find that older patients prefer branded
drugs citing increased quality and safety. They also find that this concern increases with
7
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the severity of the condition that the drug treats.
In addition to patient preference, physician preference has an important role in de-
termining prescription drug choice. Efficacy of treatment, patient cost, advertising and
detailing, and insurance contracts could influence physicians’ prescribing behavior. While
Gonul et al. (2001) find that physicians consider efficacy of treatment above patients’ cost
concerns, Lundin (2000) determines that patients with higher cost sharing are generally
prescribed lower-cost drugs, supporting the idea that patient cost influences physicians’
prescribing behavior. Gonul et al. (2001) find that the effects of advertising, detailing,
and sampling have diminishing returns in their influence of physician prescribing behavior.
Insurance plan contracts may have the most influential effect on physician prescribing
behavior. For example, Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) contract selectively
with doctors who provide certain services or agree to provide lower-cost treatment alter-
natives [Glied, 2000]. This is also common in Point of Service (POS) insurance plans
when capitation exists. In these instances, providers are penalized for excessively costly
procedures or treatments provided to patients [Glied, 2000], and physicians may be more
inclined to prescribe generic drugs under these circumstances. Hellerstein (1997) finds that
physicians are more likely to prescribe generic drugs across patients when the majority of
their patients are in HMOs. Additionally, the drugs approved or preferred by HMOs are
likely to be the drugs prescribed to all the physicians’ patients, even those in non-HMO
plans [Hellerstien, 1997].
The third important participant in the prescription drug decision is the pharmacist. In
2001, when Prozac lost patent exclusivity, eleven states required pharmacists to dispense
the generic form of the prescribed drug, should it exist: Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington,
8
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and West Virginia. All other states, except Oklahoma, had permissive substitution laws
that gave the pharmacist the ability to dispense an equivalent generic drug in place of the
branded drug prescribed by the physician. In 2004, when Neurontin lost patent exclusivity,
mandatory generic drug dispensation law expanded to Hawaii, and in 2006, when Zocor lost
patent exclusivity, Nevada and Tennessee were also bound by this law. Further, a physician
or a patient can indicate (on the prescription form) a branded or generic preference; these
are referred to as Dispense as Written (DAW) indicators. The pharmacist must honor
these requests regardless of the state’s law.
Prescription drug choice is a combination of patient, physician, and pharmacist prefer-
ence and influence. Past studies have focused on these pathways individually. We aim to
strengthen the literature by controlling for all of these pathways in our estimates of price
elasticities across three distinct drug classes.
1.3 Empirical Approach
We attempt to control for the factors that influence patient preference, physician pref-
erence, and pharmacist laws as they impact prescription drug choice. Our sample is sub-
divided by insurance plan type to account for differences in patient selection, prescription
cost-structures, and physician prescribing behavior. We also include state-specific Drug
Product Selection (DPS) laws and DAW indicators. These covariates help control for
varying patient price-sensitivity and preferences for quality.
As in other health economics studies, we must address the potential for endogeneity
from patient selection. Individuals know their health status, and can foresee healthcare
needs to a certain extent; therefore, sicker individuals might select into more generous
insurance plans because they know they will use the services. Additionally, patients may
9
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select insurance plans based on the generosity of prescription drug coverage that is related
to their expected usage of prescription drugs. Ignoring these patient selection issues during
empirical analyses can lead to biased estimates. Instead of pure price effects, our estimates
could be confounded by patient preference for prescription services and other unobservable
characteristics, such as health status.
Because of the potential for endogeneity bias and difficulty in finding valid instruments
for prescription drug prices, we include time fixed effects (FEs) to control for aggregate
level factors that may influence prescription drug choice. Additionally, we include employer
and employer-health insurance plan FEs to control for time-invariant unobservable, but
potentially confounding, characteristics of employers and insurance plans. In sensitivity
analyses, we assess the extent of patient selection into employer by analyzing different
sub-samples of our data.
We identify the impact of branded-to-generic cost differentials (CDs) on the probability
of switching between branded and generic drugs using a FE Linear Probability Model
(LPM). Our specification is
Yijp = αOOP CDijp+ βTPP CDijp+ γAWPijp+ω′Xi+ δ′Ej+µ′Sij+ ρ′Iip+λjp+ εjp,
(1.1)
where the subscripts i, j, and p represent individual, employer, and plan, respectively.
The outcome variable, Y , indicates whether or not an individual switches from Prozac to
Fluoxetine, from Zocor to Simvastatin, or from Neurontin to Gabapentin. OOP CD and
TPP CD identify the respective CDs between the generic and branded drugs, whileAWP
represents the average branded wholesale price of Prozac, Zocor, or Neurontin, dependent
upon the specification. Xi is a vector of patient characteristics, Ej is a vector of employer
10
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characteristics, Sij is a vector of state characteristics, Iip is a vector of insurance plan
characteristics, λjp are employer-plan FEs, and εjp is a white noise error term.
We consider two outcome variables based on different switching times dependent upon
whether or not an individual has switched to the generic drug within one month or within
three months of its availability. When using the outcome variable of switching within one
month, we include only individuals with 30-day prescriptions. Using three months as our
secondary outcome variable allows all individuals in the sample, regardless of prescription
fill-rate, the opportunity for at least one prescription-fill after the generic drug becomes
available.
We also identify the instantaneous probability of switching using a discrete time hazard
function. Pharmaceutical companies that manufacture branded drugs often respond to
generic introductions by changing the price of branded drug. Using a discrete time hazard
function allows us to use these time varying prices in our model. With this specification,
we can also include individual behavior that may change up until the time period in which
an individual switches.
We define the discrete time hazard as the conditional probability that switching occurs at
time t, given switching has not occurred by t: ht ≡ Pr(T = t|T > t−1) = Pr(T = t|T ≥ t).
By including the covariates identified in equation 1.1 with dummy variables to estimate
the hazard in each time period we can estimate the effects of the cost differentials and
other variable of interest on the hazard (probability that switching occurs). Our discrete
time hazard function is specified as
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logit{hit} =
logit{Pr(Ti = t|Ti ≥ t,dt,xijp)} =
logit{Pr(yit = 1|dt,xijp)} =
τ1 + τ2d2,it + · · ·+ τ16d16,it + αOOP CDijpt + βTPP CDijpt+
γAWPijpt + ω′Xit + δ′Ejt + µ′Sijt + ρ′Iipt + λjpt + εjpt,
(1.2)
where the outcome variable, yit, is a binary variable denoting whether or not individual
i switched to the generic drug in period t. The vector dt represents dummy variables for
each time period in our study, while the vector xijp contains all of the covariates described
in equation 1.1.
Using equations 1.1 and 1.2, we identify various price elasticities of switching. We iden-
tify these elasticities based upon variation within cost differentials (CDs) across employers
and plans. Table 1.1 shows the source of variation for our FE regressions, as measured
by the coefficient of variation of the CDs and branded AWPs. The coefficient of varia-
tion is calculated as the standard deviation of the CD (or branded AWP) divided by its
mean. Without any FEs, we have the largest coefficients of variation because these values
vary within employers, insurance plans, prescription-fills, and dosages. The coefficient of
variation on the CDs and AWPs decreases within employers and employer-plans because
the source of variation is limited to the insurance plans, prescription-fills, and dosages in
the former case, but only prescription-fills and dosages in the latter. The similarity in
variation across these final two specifications indicates that much of the initial variation
is across employers. The majority of employers in each drug sample offer more than one
type of insurance plan: All but one employer in the Prozac sample, 85% of the employers
in the Zocor sample, and 84% of the employers in the Nuerontin sample.
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1.4 Data
The principal sources of data for this study are the Thomson Reuters MarketScan ®
Research Databases. We use the Commercial database for prescription drug claims and
the Enrollment database for information detailing insurance plan enrollment. These data
sources provide demographic characteristics, geography, employment characteristics, in-
surance coverage, and payments by prescription claim. Additionally, we use the US Census
for detailed population characteristics at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level, in-
cluding per-capita income and population data.
1.4.1 Cost Differential and Average Wholesale Price Calculations
Our main variable of interest in determining the elasticity of switching is the CD between
the branded drug and the generic drug. We compute CDs for each individual’s out-of-
pocket (OOP) payment and their insurance company’s third-party-payer (TPP) payment,
as detailed by their insurance claim data. Because we cannot observe an individual’s
generic and branded costs in the same time period, the CDs must be imputed. During the
imputation process, we take care to match branded and generic prices based on employer,
health insurance plan type, and dosage. For ease of imputation, we calculate all CDs at
the unit level determined by dividing the OOP or TPP cost by the number of days of
drug therapy covered by the prescription. For each prescription claim made for a branded
drug, the CD is calculated using that individual’s branded cost minus an imputed generic
cost. The imputed generic cost is the average generic cost paid by individuals with the
same employer, health insurance plan, and dosage, during that specific month. Similarly,
for each generic prescription claim, we subtract that individual’s generic cost from an
imputed branded cost, which is the average branded cost paid by individuals with the
same employer, health insurance plan, and dosage, during that specific month. In the
cases when we cannot match observations based on employer, health insurance plan, and
13
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dosage, we attempt to match first on only dosage and second on employer and health
insurance plan. Using these methods, we are able to calculate CDs for over 99% of each
drug sample.
Another variable of interest for its influencing effect on switching behavior is the AWP
of the branded drug. The AWP is the average price charged by wholesalers for the specific
drug. We use the listed AWP for branded prescription claims, but impute an average
branded AWP for generic prescription claims. Using a similar process as the CD imputa-
tion for individuals choosing the generic drug, we match an average branded AWP from
individuals who purchase the branded drug during that specific month and who have the
same employer, health insurance plan, and dosage. There are more missing values for
the AWP variable than for our CD variables, but we still match over 98% of our Prozac
sample, 94% of our Zocor sample, and 93% of our Neurontin sample using this imputation
method.
1.4.2 Sample Creation
Our most inclusive drug samples are comprised of individuals with at least one prescrip-
tion claim (for the respective drug) during the 90-day interval before generic introduction,
and at least one claim for that drug (or its generic equivalent) during the 16 months after
its generic introduction. We consider the 90-day period prior to patent expiration, to
ensure we include individuals with 90-day, 60-day, and 30-day prescriptions. We limit our
analysis to the 16-month period following generic introduction to decrease the likelihood
that switching is due to reasons other than the lowered price caused by the generic intro-
duction. We detail the Prozac sample creation process below, and subsequently summarize
the sample creation processes for Zocor and Neurontin.
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Prozac lost patent exclusivity on August 2, 2001 [Druss et al., 2004], and the generic form
of the drug, Fluoxetine, became available in pharmacies the next day. For our sample, we
consider all individuals with at least one prescription-fill for Prozac between May 1, 2001
and July 31, 2001 thus limiting the observations to the time-period immediately before
the generic prescription became available. We subsequently match these individuals to
their prescription-fills for Prozac or Fluoxetine between August 1, 2001 and December
31, 2002; we keep any individual with at least one of these prescription-fills during this
time period. Upon completion of this process, we have 34,810 unique individual claims
for Prozac or Fluoxetine. Of the 34,810 individual observations, we can compute CDs for
99.75% of them and AWP prices for 98% of them, yielding a data set containing 34,163
observations.
We conduct the same sample selection process for individuals using Zocor during the
three months prior to the availability of its generic drug, Simvastatin, which entered
the market on June 23, 2006 [Smith, 2006]. We subsequently identify whether or not
those individuals maintained their use of Zocor or switched to Simvastatin at some point
during the first 16 months of its availability (through December 2007); this process yields
114,215 observations. Although we are able to calculate CDs for the entire sample, we can
only construct AWPs for approximately 94% of this sample, resulting in 107,749 usable
observations.
Gabapentin, the generic form of Neurontin, appeared on the market in October of 2004
[Kaplan Fox, 2009]. We identify 38,014 individuals who had a prescription claim for
Neurontin between July of 2004 and October of 2004, with a subsequent prescription for
Neurontin or Gabapentin before February, 2006. As with Zocor, we create CDs for the
entire sample, but we are only able to construct AWPs for approximately 93% of this
sample, which yields 35,404 usable observations.
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1.4.3 Sample Characteristics
We subset each drug sample by insurance plan type and additionally by prescription-fill
rates (30-day, 60-day, or 90-day). Tables 1.2 through 1.7 contain the means and standard
deviations of the demographic, geographic, employment, insurance, and prescription con-
trol variables for each sub-sample by drug. The regression samples are slightly smaller than
original data sets due to missing insurance plan characteristics, employer characteristics,
or geographic indication.
The final Prozac sample includes 33,747 individual observations, of which 26,565 are in-
dividuals with 30-day prescriptions. The final Zocor sample contains 105,178 observations,
of which less than half (48,681) are 30-day prescriptions. The final Neurontin sample is
similar in size to the Prozac sample; there are 34,994 individual observations, of which
26,564 are 30-day prescriptions. All three samples have similar geographic, employment,
and insurance plan characteristics, but they differ across demographic and prescription
characteristics. The underlying illnesses these drugs treat vary, therefore, it is unsurpris-
ing that each sample varies across age, gender, and prescription-specific preferences. The
Prozac and Neurontin samples are comprised primarily of females (77% and 64%, respec-
tively), while the Zocor sample is comprised mostly of males (58%). The Zocor sample
contains the highest average age of prescription claimants, with 90% of the sample over
the age of 45, and almost 60% over the age of 55. Seventy-six percent of the Neurontin
sample claimants are over the age of 45, while 61% of the Prozac are in this age group.
The individual-prescription characteristics also vary slightly between insurance and drug
sub-samples. In the Prozac and Neurontin samples, new prescriptions are slightly higher
within the Comprehensive and PPO sub-sample at approximately 50%, and in all three
samples the mail-order prescription fill rate is slightly higher in the Comprehensive and
PPO insurance sub-sample. For some observations, the prescription order fulfillment
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method is unknown; because this data is often missing (especially in the Prozac sam-
ple), we construct a dummy variable, Mail Order Unknown, note the missing information,
and keep these observations in our sample. In all drug samples, DAW indicators are more
common within the HMO and POS sub-samples, but are least common within the Zo-
cor sample, followed by the Neurontin sample, then the Prozac sample. This indicator
may demonstrate patient and physician preferences for the branded drug, and indicates
that there is a stronger desire to continue use of the branded drug in the antidepressant
class and the anticonvulsant class than in the statin class. Mandatory drug substitution
laws were unchanged across all drug samples and apply to approximately 15%–25% of the
observations based on patient state of residence.
Additionally, there are some differences in characteristics across insurance group sub-
samples. The HMO and POS sub-samples are slightly younger, with a larger percentage
of enrollees in the 35–44 year-old age group and fewer in the over-55 year-old age group.
This is consistent with the literature that details selection of younger, healthier individuals
into more restrictive plans like HMOs [Luft and Miller, 1988], and shows some evidence
of selection into insurance plan types. There are large differences between the insurance
plan sub-samples in terms of geographic location, further supporting the hypothesis that
these two insurance sub-samples represent different populations: The Comprehensive and
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) sub-samples have a greater presence in the North-
Central and Southern United States and a lower presence in the Northeast and West. The
Comprehensive and PPO sub-samples have a greater percentage of union members and
retirees; they also have a much greater number of enrollees who are employed in the
services sectors. The HMO and POS sub-samples have a greater percentage of enrollees
from the transportation, communication, and utilities sectors.
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The Comprehensive and PPO insurance sub-sample within the Prozac data set contains
58% PPO members and 42% Comprehensive plan members. The corresponding Zocor and
Neurontin sub-samples also have a majority of their individuals enrolled in PPO plans, but
at an even greater 81%. This distinction may represent a trend away from comprehensive
insurance plans between 2001 and 2006. In the Prozac sample, only 13% of the HMO and
POS sub-sample contains HMO members, which is substantially lower than the 56% of
the Neurontin sample and the 60% of the Zocor sample. This may be indicative of a trend
away from POS plans and towards HMO plans between 2001-2006 for the sub-population
represented by this data.
1.4.4 Outcome Variables
Summary statistics for our outcome variables are listed in Table 1.8. Prozac has the
largest initial increase in generic prescriptions within the first month of introduction,
with 27% of individuals switching immediately. Approximately 10% of individuals in the
Neurontin sub-sample switch during this time period, and Zocor has the fewest immediate
switchers at 6%. Within three months, between 40% and 60% of individuals switch to
the generic for all drugs. The largest switching percentage occurs between Prozac and
Fluoxetine, while the smallest occurs between Neurontin and Gabapentin. In the case
of Prozac there is no significant difference in switching behavior across insurance sub-
samples. However, within the Zocor sample, more individuals from Comprehensive and
PPO insurance plans switch than the HMO and POS insurance plans, while the opposite
is true in the Neurontin sub-sample.
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1.4.5 Cost Differential Variables
As shown in Tables 1.9 and 1.10, we see similar CDs across insurance plan sub-samples.
In the cases of Prozac and Neurontin, the CDs within the Comprehensive and PPO sub-
sample are slightly larger than the HMO and POS sub-sample, but the opposite is true for
Zocor. These differences in CDs could be the result of varying composition of coinsurance
and copayment policies across sub-samples. Zocor has the largest average OOP CD across
all plans and prescription-fill rates. As shown in Table 1.10, the average individual would
pay approimately $0.40 more per unit1 of Zocor than Simvastatin. The average Prozac
user would pay approximately $0.35 more for a unit of Prozac than Fluoxetine, while the
average Neurontin user would pay approximately $0.23 more per unit of Neurontin than
Gabapentin.
We find more variation across drugs in the TPP CDs, which is due in part to the vary-
ing competitive structures across pharmaceutical drug markets upon generic introduction.
When introduced to the market, Fluoxetine was only produced by one company, and that
company had market exclusivity (among generic competition) for six months. During this
time period, the price of Fluoxetine remained high because of the initial lack of compe-
tition; upon generic introduction, the average TPP unit cost of Fluoxetine was actually
$0.27 more than the average unit cost of Prozac. Because the price of Fluoxetine was high
immediately upon its introduction, we conduct sensitivity analyses in which we compute
the CDs as the difference between each branded drug and a generic antidepressant drug
that has been available for over thirty years, Amitriptyline. We expect that insurance
companies (especially ones using a copayment structure) base their prescription formu-
laries on the expected low price of generic drugs. We note that the TPP CD changes
1The unit costs are calculated by dividing the total cost by the number of days of drug therapy covered
by the prescription.
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substantially when comparing Prozac to Amitriptyline, an established generic antidepres-
sant; the average per unit cost of Amitriptlyine is $3.09 less than the average per unit cost
of Prozac. We would expect the TPP CD between Prozac and Fluoxetine to approach
that of Prozac and Amitriplyline over time, as more generic competition occurs.
Upon generic entry of Simvastatin, no single manufacturer was given exclusive produc-
tion rights [Smith, 2006]. Two manufacturers, Teva Pharmaceuticals and Ranbaxy Labs,
were granted immediate entrance into the market creating a more competitive environ-
ment than the introduction of Fluoxetine. Additionally, when Simvastatin entered the
market, Merck chose to lower the price of Zocor in order to compete with the generic
entrants on the basis of price. This is evident by the smaller TPP CD between Zocor and
Simvastatin than any other pair analyzed in this study; an insurance company would pay
an average of $0.53 more per unit of Zocor than Simvastatin during this time period.
When Gabapentin was introduced to the market, it was manufactured by three compa-
nies, Teva Pharmaceuticals, Ivax, and Alphaparm [Decker and Petypiece, 2007]. In this
instance, Pfizer did not decrease the price of Neurontin and even continued its advertis-
ing campaign throughout the generic introduction period [Saul, 2008]. This resulted in a
larger TPP CD; an insurance company would pay an average of $1.87 more for a unit of
Neurontin than Gabapentin during this time period.
In table 1.11 we have extrapolated the unit CDs and AWPs to 30-day prescription
prices by quartile. The median OOP CDs for a 30-day prescriptions of Prozac, Zocor, and
Neurontin are $18.41, $19.81, and $11.18, respectively. The median TTP CD is -$38.57
for a 30-day prescription of Prozac, increases to $39.07 for a 30-day Zocor prescription,
and $73.14 for a 30-day Neurontin prescription. Prozac and Zocor have relatively similar
AWP prices, around $160, for a 30-day prescription, while Neurontin is slightly higher at
20
1.5. RESULTS
$177.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Primary Results
Our principal analysis uses the employer FE model described in Section 1.3. The com-
plete regression results for these models using the 30-day prescription samples are listed
in Appendix A. All other regression results are available from the authors, by request.
We detail the elasticity estimates for switching within one month in Table 1.12, and the
estimates for switching within three months in Table 1.13. Each table contains the results
for all insurance sub-samples: Comprehensive and POS, HMO and PPO, and all plans
combined. The first three columns contain the price elasticities from the specification
with no FEs, the middle three columns contain the price elasticities from the specification
including employer FEs, and the final three columns contain employer health insurance
plan FEs. All specifications include time fixed effects, and standard errors clustered by
employer and health insurance plan
If we assume patients select plans based on unobservable health status, patients in
poorer health would select plans with lower branded drug costs, resulting in smaller cost
differentials that would cause over-estimation of the price elasticities due to omitted vari-
able bias. As shown in Tables 1.12 and 1.13, without including any FEs we find slightly
higher estimated elasticities than with employer or employer-plan FEs. For example,
within the Comprehensive and PPO sub-sample of the full Prozac sample, the OOP CD
price elasticity is 0.056 without any FEs and 0.052 with both employer and employer-plan
FEs. Similar (and often smaller) changes occur in the other sub-sample regressions, and
in TTP CD and AWP price elasticity estimates across all drug samples. Our results across
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FE specifications suggest limited selection into employer plans because our elasticities re-
main relatively unchanged across both employer and employer-plan FE specifications. We
include employer FEs in all subsequent specifications.
Our price elasticity estimates detailed in Tables 1.12 and 1.13 indicate the effect of a
one-percent change in the CD on the probability of switching between the branded and
the generic drug. These results vary across insurance sub-samples and drugs. In the
case of Prozac, we find that a one-percent change in the OOP CD results in an increased
probability of switching from Prozac to Fluoxetine of between 0.05% and 0.08% depending
upon health insurance plan type. The larger effects within the HMO and POS sub-sample
indicate increased price sensitivity for individuals who select into these more restrictive
forms of insurance in exchange for lower premiums. We find the effects to be smaller in the
case of switching between Zocor and Simvastatin, where a one-percent change in the OOP
CD results in an increased probability of switching of approximately 0.03%. We find no
significant effects of OOP CDs on switching behavior within the Neurontin to Gabapentin
sample.
Table 1.13 displays the estimated price elasticities for switching between the branded and
generic drug within three months of the generic introduction, and considers prescription-
fills of all lengths. In the case of Prozac, we find that the price elasticity falls in signif-
icance and magnitude to 0.02. The effects decrease in significance and magnitude when
comparing switching within one month to switching within three months. This implies
that individuals with the highest CDs are switching to the generic drug before individuals
with lower CDs, or that individuals with the 60-day and 90-day prescription-fills are less
likely to switch. In addition, it may be the case that non-price factors, such as safety,
are stronger determinants of the switching decision for late adopters of the generic drug.
We see the opposite trend when reviewing the price elasticities for Zocor using the full
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sample. A one-percent increase in OOP CD increases the likelihood of switching between
0.03% and 0.05%. The elasticities estimated for Zocor using the full sample are more
indicative of the average price elasticities of this sample because more than 50% of our full
sample has 90-day prescriptions. Again, we find stronger OOP CD results in the HMO
and POS sub-sample, providing additional evidence of the increased price sensitivity of
individuals who choose this type of insurance plan. The lower price sensitivity of Prozac
over time, as compared to Zocor, may result from greater concern about the side effects of
antidepressants, or because the efficacy of antidepressants tends to vary to a larger extent
across patients than it does for statins.
The TPP price elasticities have varying levels of significance across the Prozac and Zocor
drug samples, as well. The magnitudes are larger for the 30-day model than the full model
for Prozac, implying that they may better capture short-term inducements. The effects
are consistent in magnitude across most specifications (between 0.02 and 0.09), except
for the AWP branded price in the HMO and POS sub-sample. The large impact of 0.84
indicates the significant influence of the branded wholesale price on switching behavior
for this sub-sample. The TPP CD is only significant in the full sample analysis of Zocor;
the elasticities are estimated to be between 0.01 and 0.02 in this case. For Prozac these
third-party metrics have similar magnitudes when compared to the OOP metrics, but in
the case of Zocor the TPP metrics have a decreased effect in comparison. Again, this may
be a result of the pricing strategy used by Merck when Simvastatin was introduced into
the market.
In the case of Neurontin, our price elasticity estimates increase in significance and be-
come negative when considering all prescriptions and switching within three months. Ini-
tially, this seems to be a puzzling result; an increase in the OOP CD between the branded
and the generic drug decreases the probability of switching to the generic by between
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0.02% and 0.03%. However, we also find that the TPPs and AWPs effects are negative,
and have a much larger magnitude in the Neurontin sample than in the other drug sam-
ples. This highlights the importance of the role of insurance companies, physicians, and
pharmacists in the prescription decision. The negative TPP and AWP effects could be
the result of rebates, physician detailing, or other inducements not captured elsewhere in
our model. Some of this effect may have spilled over to the consumer, who may associate
higher branded costs with increased quality [Dubois et al., 2000], and have an especially
high preference for quality in this class of drugs. Additionally, Pfizer continued to ad-
vertise for Neurontin after Gabapentin entered the market and continued to advocate for
off-label use [Saul, 2008]. These practices could have induced consumers and physicians
to continue using the branded drug even with the availability of lower-priced generics.
We use Logit and LPM specifications to estimate the hazard function using equation
1.2 and provide the resulting price elasticities in Table 1.14. In these models, we include
multiple observations for each individual during the 16 months after the generic drug
becomes available. Our dependent variable is a binary variable set to one during the
first time period an individual switches. Many of the covariates remain fixed during each
time period, but the CDs and AWPs vary with time. As in our original specification,
we include time and employer fixed effects, and cluster the standard errors by employer
and health insurance plan. These results represent the price elasticity associated with the
instantaneous probability of switching at any point in time.
We do not find any statistically significant effects of the OOP CD on the instantaneous
probability of switching in the case of Prozac. This contrasts from our initial findings
indicating a positive and significant effect of OOP CD on switching within one month.
The TPP CD and AWP price continue to have a more significant effect on switching from
Prozac to Fluoxetine than the OOP CD, and this is consistent across specifications.
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As in the previous estimation, we find the OOP CD to be more important when switch-
ing between Zocor and Simvastatin than any of our other measures of price. The price
elasticities we estimate from the hazard function using the LPM are similar in magnitude
to the price elasticities found using the original LPM.
In the case of Neurontin, we find more significant effects than in our discrete time hazard
model than our original LPM specification. The TPP CD and AWP continue to have a
negative impact on switching, but we find the OOP CD to have a positive and significant
effect in the case of the Comprehensive and PPO insurance plan types. This is in contrast
to our previous specification in which the OOP CD has a negative effect on switching to
Neurontin within three months. There are several possible explanations for these varying
results. First, when Gabapentin was introduced into the market, there was a significant
amount of off-label use of Nuerontin, and individuals who use the branded drug for off-
label use may be more skeptical about switching to a generic drug. This is something our
model cannot capture, therefore it could be confounding our results. Second, we base our
hazard model on the individual’s first switch to the generic drug; we do not consider cases
where individuals switch back to the branded drug after having a negative experience with
the branded drug. These individual effects could be amplified within the neurological class
and represent another potentially confounding pathway.
1.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
We estimated four additional specifications to gain more insight into the robustness
of our empirical results. First, we specify another set of regressions in which we do not
include DAW indicators in order to validate their effects on the price elasticity estimates.
We omit the DAW indicators from our regression specification to determine whether they
are capturing some of the effect of price. Including these variables may be decreasing the
true estimation of the price elasticity because those patients with the least price sensitivity
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are the most likely to avoid generic prescriptions through physician overrides. Second,
we remove the TPP CD from our specification to understand its relationship with the
OOP CD and the branded AWP prices. Third, we assess the extent of patient selection
into employer by analyzing two sub-samples of our data in which one contains employers
that only offer one insurance plan, and the other contains employers offering multiple
plans. Fourth, we compute CDs associated with switching from Prozac to Amitriptyline
rather than Fluoxetine. The former is a generic antidepressant that has been available
for a number of years and has reached its equilibrium price. In contrast, the price of
Fluoxetine decreased steadily over the two years following its introduction. If insurance
plans establish cost sharing levels based on the expected steady-state price of generic
drugs, the CD between Prozac and Amitriptyline may be a better proxy for the future
branded-to-generic CD than the initial CD between Prozac and Fluoxetine (during which
Fluoxetine did not experience any competition from other generic manufacturers). We
therefore determine price elasticities using Amitriptyline, which has settled at its expected,
much-lower-than-branded price.
As shown in the middle columns of Tables 1.15 and 1.16, removing the DAW indicators
increases the price elasticity estimates in all specifications across sub-samples and drugs.
This suggests the inclusion of the DAW indicators may capture a small portion of the
impact that price has on switching. However, we prefer the specifications that include
these indicators because they are less likely to be confounded by differences in prescribing
norms and pharmacy behavior.
The final three columns of Tables 1.15 and 1.16 contain the price elasticities from the
specification without the TPP CDs. The TPP CDs represent a physician inducement
pathway, and these results provide insight into the varying effects of TPP and AWP
pricing on switching behavior across drugs. In the case of Prozac, removing the TPP CDs
26
1.5. RESULTS
from the specifications increases the effects of the OOP CDs and decreases the effects of the
AWP prices. This implies that the TPP CD has a significant impact on switching behavior
that could be mistakenly attributed to consumer price sensitivity if these variables are not
included in the model. We see a similar trend in the Neurontin elasticities, although the
AWP effects also capture some of the TPP CD effect when it is removed. In the case of
the Zocor samples, the full sample is robust to removal of the TPP CD, which implies
there is no correlation between these variables in this drug sub-sample.
We conduct another sensitivity test to infer the extent to which individuals select into
employers based on health insurance offerings. Specifically, we consider those individuals
with a choice of health insurance plan type versus those whose employer offers only one
option. We compare the estimated coefficients on OOP CDs across these two sub-samples
and the entire pooled sample to determine whether or not there is a systematic difference
between the samples. If the coefficients are consistent across these samples, we believe this
shows some evidence of a lack of selection into employer based on health insurance offerings.
If there were such selection, we would expect to see higher OOP CD price elasticities in
the sample containing employers with multiple plan options, as sicker individuals would
select employers offering more than one insurance plan. In the case of Prozac, about
6% of its observations have only one health insurance plan choice (all of which have a
POS health insurance plan), while approximately 8.5% of the Zocor sample has only one
health insurance plan choice. In the Neurontin sample 14%, of the observations are in the
sub-sample with only one plan type offered.
Table 1.17 contains the elasticities across the two sub-samples by the number of plan
types offered; the first three columns in Table 1.15 contain the elasticities of the pooled
sample. Across all sub-samples and drugs, we find higher estimated effects within the
sub-sample of the population with only one health insurance plan type available. This
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implies that individuals who are employed by companies with only one insurance plan
type are more price sensitive than those with more insurance plan options. If selection
into employer existed, we would expect to see the opposite result. We believe these results
show a lack of selection at the employer level, indicating that this source of endogeneity
does not counfound our estimates.
Table 1.18 shows the results from our analysis using the Amitriptyline costs; in general,
the TPP CD and the AWP of the branded drug are positive and statistically significant.
The TPP CD results in a 0.07% to 0.22% increased probability of switching, with the
smaller effect occurring over the longer switching time of three months. These effects
are larger in magnitude than those estimated using the Prozac to Fluoxetine CDs, which
implies that price sensitivity increases as the price of the generic drug decreases.
1.6 Conclusions
This is the first analysis to identify the price elasticities of switching from branded to
generic drugs during the time period of generic entry. We accomplish this using empir-
ical approaches that account for potential issues of endogeneity associated with patient
selection into insurance plan while also considering changes in prescription drug prices
and patient preferences over time. The OOP CDs provide a direct analysis of consumer
behavior, while the TPP CDs provide additional information about the extent to which
physicians and insurance plans influence switching behavior.
Our results show that the estimated effect of the OOP CD varies by insurance sub-
sample and class of drug, which implies that prescription payment plans and heterogeneous
preferences across disease treatment influence patient behavior differently. For example,
in the case of Zocor, we find that the OOP CDs have a greater influence on switching
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behavior than the corresponding TPP CDs, and the influence is greatest among those
individuals who participate in an HMO or a POS insurance plan. Alternatively, in the
case of Prozac and Neurontin, the TPP CDs and branded AWPs have a larger impact
than the OOP CDs. These effects are negative when considering switching within three
months from Gabapentin to Neurontin. We believe external factors that are outside our
ability to control could be causing these results. Some of these external factors could
include increased sensitivity among Neurontin users to side effects of Gabapentin, and the
promotion of off-label use by the manufacturers of Neurontin.
Based on our OOP CDs, we estimate the elasticity of switching between Prozac and
Fluoxetine to be between 0.02 and 0.08; similarly, we find the TPP CDs to have an
elasticity between 0.01 and 0.09. We estimate the OOP CD elasticity of switching between
Zocor and Simvastatin to be between 0.03 and 0.05, and the TPP CD to be between 0.01
and 0.02. In the case of Neurontin, we highlight the importance of insurance companies,
physicians, and pharmacists in the prescription drug choice as the TPP variables are much
more significant than the consumer variables and even discourage generic use.
These price elasticity estimates offer insight into the mechanisms influencing patient
switching behavior from generic to branded drugs. The variation across insurance plans
and class of prescription drug can be used to tailor prescription plans to induce increased
levels of switching, thereby reducing prescription costs for both public and private payers.
For example in the case of Zocor, each one percent increase in OOP CD ($1.20 decrease
in generic payment per 30-day script) increases an individual’s probability of switching to
Simvastatin by approximately 0.03 percentage points (6%). With these additional individ-
uals choosing the generic drug, the TPP cost savings amounts to $14.73 per prescription
(with the change of cost sharing from patient to third-party-payer the unit TPP CD de-
creases by $0.04 to $0.491). In 2005, there were 37.5 million prescription claims for Zocor.
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If 51.6% of users switched within three months instead of 48.6%, this would correspond to
1.135 million additional generic prescription claims and a TPP savings of $16.72 million.
Despite seemingly small elasticity estimates, real cost savings can be achieved by adjusting
cost-sharing plans in accordance with patient behavior.
Our study is limited to drugs that become generic during our sample period. Future
research could improve upon our results by identifying price elasticities in more drug classes
in addition to cross-price elasticities within individual drug classes. As demonstrated in
our Neurontin results, we also face some limitations due to data availability. There are
some external factors that could influence switching behavior that are beyond our ability
to model, and these factors could vary across drug class (e.g. off-label use). Despite these
limitations, our robustness analyses indicate consistent results across various specifications.
1.7 Tables
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Table 1.1: Sources of Variation
Coefficient of Variation†
30-day Scripts All Scripts
Across all Within Within Across all Within Within
Individuals Employer Employer-Plan Individuals Employer Employer-Plan
Prozac to Fluoxetine:
OOP CD 1.024 0.100 0.112 1.103 0.157 0.162
TPP CD 2.632 0.360 0.386 5.314 1.123 1.164
AWP Prozac 0.941 0.108 0.136 0.880 0.097 0.129
Zocor to Simvastatin:
OOP CD 0.981 0.071 0.095 1.858 0.478 0.508
TPP CD 0.998 0.092 0.115 2.318 0.386 0.416
AWP Zocor 1.198 0.182 0.212 0.907 0.094 0.127
Neurontin to Gabapentin:
OOP CD 1.568 0.203 0.229 2.249 0.385 0.418
TPP CD 1.839 0.235 0.261 1.932 0.211 0.237
AWP Neurontin 0.415 0.113 0.130 0.445 0.094 0.107
† Variation calculated as the standard deviation divided by the mean.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Control Variables Prozac for 30-day Scripts
Comprehensive HMO and All Plans
and PPO Sample POS Sample Sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Demographic Variables:
Age Under 18 0.037 0.188 0.042 0.201 0.039 0.194
Age 18-34 0.119 0.323 0.167 0.373 0.139 0.346
Age 35-44 0.204 0.403 0.298 0.457 0.243 0.429
Age 45-54 0.374 0.484 0.332 0.471 0.356 0.479
Age Over 55 0.267 0.443 0.161 0.368 0.223 0.416
Male 0.234 0.424 0.244 0.430 0.238 0.426
Female 0.766 0.424 0.756 0.430 0.762 0.426
Geographic Variables:
Northeast 0.085 0.278 0.240 0.427 0.149 0.357
North Central 0.388 0.487 0.177 0.381 0.300 0.458
South 0.486 0.500 0.471 0.499 0.480 0.500
West 0.041 0.198 0.112 0.316 0.071 0.257
Urban Indicator 0.704 0.457 0.854 0.353 0.767 0.423
Employment Variables:
Non-Union 0.217 0.412 0.640 0.480 0.394 0.489
Union 0.278 0.448 0.118 0.322 0.211 0.408
Union Unknown 0.505 0.500 0.243 0.429 0.396 0.489
Active FT 0.778 0.416 0.812 0.391 0.792 0.406
Active PT 0.003 0.053 0.028 0.164 0.013 0.114
Retiree 0.192 0.394 0.129 0.335 0.165 0.371
Other Status 0.028 0.164 0.032 0.176 0.029 0.169
Manuf., Durable Goods 0.066 0.249 0.194 0.395 0.119 0.324
Manuf., Nondurable Goods 0.094 0.291 0.034 0.180 0.069 0.253
Transp., Comm., Utilities 0.074 0.261 0.356 0.479 0.191 0.393
Services 0.236 0.425 0.048 0.214 0.158 0.364
Other Industry 0.029 0.166 0.087 0.281 0.053 0.224
Employee Size (10,000s) 17.698 14.329 8.068 0.204 16.121 12.257
Number of Observations 15,472 11,093 26,565
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Control Variables Prozac for 30-day Scripts (con-
tinued)
Comprehensive HMO and All Plans
and PPO Sample POS Sample Sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
MSA Variables:
Per Cap. Income ($1000s) 22.747 3.177 23.517 3.695 14.695 11.427
Population (100,000s) 2159 2060 2157 1972 2158 2019
MSA Info Unknown 0.296 0.457 0.296 0.457 0.233 0.423
Insurance Variables:
Comprehensive 0.406 0.491 0.000 0.000 0.236 0.425
PPO 0.594 0.491 0.000 0.000 0.346 0.476
HMO 0.000 0.000 0.159 0.366 0.066 0.249
POS 0.000 0.000 0.384 0.486 0.160 0.367
POS w/ Capitation 0.000 0.000 0.457 0.498 0.191 0.393
Prescription Variables:
New Prescription 0.431 0.495 0.407 0.491 0.421 0.494
No DAW 0.747 0.435 0.756 0.429 0.751 0.432
Physician DAW 0.051 0.220 0.088 0.283 0.066 0.249
Patient DAW 0.095 0.294 0.136 0.343 0.112 0.316
Retail Prescription 0.603 0.489 0.782 0.413 0.677 0.467
Mail Order 0.014 0.118 0.006 0.080 0.011 0.104
Mail Status Unknown 0.383 0.486 0.212 0.409 0.312 0.463
Mandatory Drug Subs. 0.121 0.326 0.467 0.499 0.265 0.442
Number of Observations 15,472 11,093 26,565
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of Control Variables Prozac for All Scripts
Comprehensive HMO and All Plans
and PPO Sample POS Sample Sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Demographic Variables:
Age Under 18 0.033 0.179 0.037 0.190 0.035 0.184
Age 18-34 0.109 0.312 0.141 0.348 0.123 0.329
Age 35-44 0.193 0.395 0.270 0.444 0.228 0.419
Age 45-54 0.375 0.484 0.344 0.475 0.361 0.480
Age Over 55 0.289 0.453 0.208 0.406 0.253 0.435
Male 0.238 0.426 0.247 0.431 0.242 0.428
Female 0.762 0.426 0.753 0.431 0.758 0.428
Geographic Variables:
Northeast 0.093 0.291 0.231 0.421 0.155 0.362
North Central 0.416 0.493 0.199 0.399 0.319 0.466
South 0.446 0.497 0.456 0.498 0.450 0.498
West 0.045 0.207 0.115 0.319 0.076 0.265
Urban Indicator 0.703 0.457 0.854 0.353 0.771 0.420
Employment Variables:
Non-Union 0.243 0.429 0.604 0.489 0.404 0.491
Union 0.296 0.456 0.123 0.329 0.219 0.413
Union Unknown 0.462 0.499 0.272 0.445 0.377 0.485
Active FT 0.761 0.427 0.777 0.416 0.768 0.422
Active PT 0.003 0.051 0.022 0.147 0.011 0.106
Retiree 0.204 0.403 0.166 0.372 0.187 0.390
Other Status 0.033 0.178 0.035 0.183 0.034 0.180
Manuf., Durable Goods 0.073 0.261 0.274 0.446 0.163 0.369
Manuf., Nondurable Goods 0.116 0.321 0.038 0.191 0.081 0.273
Transp., Comm., Utilities 0.074 0.262 0.318 0.466 0.183 0.387
Services 0.250 0.433 0.042 0.202 0.157 0.364
Other Industry 0.032 0.176 0.095 0.293 0.060 0.238
Employee Size (10,000s) 16.607 13.837 14.787 8.362 15.794 11.745
Number of Observations 18,663 15,084 33,747
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of Control Variables Prozac for All Scripts (contin-
ued)
Comprehensive HMO and All Plans
and PPO Sample POS Sample Sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
MSA Variables:
Per Cap. Income ($1000s) 22.711 3.200 23.361 3.606 23.033 3.421
Population (100,000s) 2099 2052 2096 1957 2098 2005
MSA Info Unknown 0.297 0.457 0.146 0.353 0.229 0.420
Insurance Variables:
Comprehensive 0.417 0.493 0.000 0.000 0.231 0.421
PPO 0.583 0.493 0.000 0.000 0.322 0.467
HMO 0.000 0.000 0.129 0.335 0.058 0.233
POS 0.000 0.000 0.393 0.488 0.176 0.381
POS w/ Capitation 0.000 0.000 0.478 0.500 0.214 0.410
Prescription Variables:
New Prescription 0.467 0.499 0.384 0.486 0.430 0.495
No DAW 0.763 0.425 0.787 0.410 0.774 0.418
Physician DAW 0.058 0.233 0.088 0.284 0.071 0.257
Patient DAW 0.087 0.282 0.106 0.308 0.096 0.294
Retail Prescription 0.547 0.498 0.591 0.492 0.567 0.496
Mail Order 0.118 0.323 0.111 0.314 0.115 0.319
Mail Status Unknown 0.335 0.472 0.297 0.457 0.318 0.466
Mandatory Drug Subs. 0.134 0.341 0.438 0.496 0.270 0.444
Number of Observations 18,663 15,084 33,747
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics of Control Variables Zocor for 30-day Scripts
Comprehensive HMO and All Plans
and PPO Sample POS Sample Sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Demographic Variables:
Age Under 18 0.000 0.021 0.001 0.029 0.001 0.025
Age 18-34 0.016 0.124 0.019 0.137 0.017 0.130
Age 35-44 0.100 0.300 0.124 0.330 0.111 0.314
Age 45-54 0.333 0.471 0.367 0.482 0.348 0.476
Age Over 55 0.551 0.497 0.489 0.500 0.523 0.499
Male 0.561 0.496 0.577 0.494 0.568 0.495
Female 0.439 0.496 0.423 0.494 0.432 0.495
Geographic Variables:
Northeast 0.075 0.263 0.107 0.309 0.089 0.285
North Central 0.254 0.435 0.179 0.383 0.222 0.416
South 0.576 0.494 0.451 0.498 0.520 0.500
West 0.095 0.294 0.263 0.440 0.169 0.375
Urban Indicator 0.769 0.422 0.891 0.312 0.823 0.382
Employment Variables:
Non-Union 0.467 0.499 0.515 0.500 0.489 0.500
Union 0.175 0.380 0.159 0.366 0.169 0.374
Union Unknown 0.358 0.480 0.325 0.468 0.342 0.474
Active FT 0.534 0.499 0.727 0.446 0.619 0.486
Active PT 0.005 0.072 0.013 0.114 0.009 0.092
Retiree 0.203 0.402 0.150 0.358 0.180 0.384
Other Status 0.258 0.437 0.110 0.313 0.192 0.394
Manuf., Durable Goods 0.225 0.418 0.252 0.434 0.236 0.425
Manuf., Nondurable Goods 0.101 0.302 0.021 0.145 0.067 0.251
Transp., Comm., Utilities 0.034 0.182 0.136 0.342 0.079 0.270
Services 0.082 0.274 0.020 0.139 0.054 0.227
Other Industry 0.076 0.265 0.075 0.264 0.078 0.269
Employer Enrollment (10,000s) 43.530 61.924 29.401 28.861 37.116 50.642
Number of Observations 27,244 21,102 48,681
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics of Control Variables Zocor for 30-day Scripts (con-
tinued)
Comprehensive HMO and All Plans
and PPO Sample POS Sample Sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
MSA Variables:
Per Cap. Income ($1000s) 25.297 4.218 26.220 4.633 25.748 4.444
Population (100,000s) 1907 2128 2228 2165 2061 2180
MSA Info Unknown 0.232 0.422 0.109 0.312 0.177 0.382
Insurance Variables:
Comprehensive 0.083 0.276 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.210
PPO 0.917 0.276 0.000 0.000 0.513 0.500
HMO 0.000 0.000 0.693 0.461 0.301 0.459
POS 0.000 0.000 0.291 0.454 0.126 0.332
POS w/ Capitation 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.126 0.007 0.083
Prescription Variables:
New Prescription 0.426 0.495 0.407 0.491 0.419 0.493
No DAW 0.834 0.372 0.717 0.450 0.783 0.412
Physician DAW 0.028 0.166 0.038 0.190 0.032 0.177
Patient DAW 0.076 0.265 0.192 0.394 0.127 0.333
Retail Prescription 0.981 0.138 0.917 0.276 0.953 0.212
Mail Order 0.008 0.091 0.006 0.076 0.007 0.085
Mail Order Unknown 0.011 0.104 0.078 0.267 0.040 0.195
Mandatory Drug Subs. 0.205 0.404 0.275 0.446 0.236 0.424
Number of Observations 27,244 21,102 48,681
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics of Control Variables Zocor All Scripts
Comprehensive HMO and All Plans
and PPO Sample POS Sample Sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Demographic Variables:
Age Under 18 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.018
Age 18-34 0.010 0.099 0.013 0.114 0.011 0.106
Age 35-44 0.072 0.258 0.094 0.292 0.082 0.274
Age 45-54 0.291 0.454 0.322 0.467 0.305 0.460
Age Over 55 0.628 0.483 0.571 0.495 0.602 0.489
Male 0.575 0.494 0.593 0.491 0.583 0.493
Female 0.425 0.494 0.407 0.491 0.417 0.493
Geographic Variables:
Northeast 0.078 0.269 0.131 0.337 0.102 0.303
North Central 0.346 0.476 0.228 0.419 0.294 0.456
South 0.478 0.500 0.400 0.490 0.443 0.497
West 0.097 0.296 0.241 0.428 0.160 0.367
Urban Indicator 0.788 0.409 0.893 0.309 0.834 0.372
Employment Variables:
Non-Union 0.431 0.495 0.542 0.498 0.481 0.500
Union 0.285 0.452 0.181 0.385 0.240 0.427
Union Unknown 0.284 0.451 0.276 0.447 0.280 0.449
Active FT 0.503 0.500 0.666 0.472 0.576 0.494
Active PT 0.005 0.069 0.011 0.103 0.007 0.085
Retiree 0.304 0.460 0.222 0.416 0.267 0.443
Other Status 0.189 0.392 0.101 0.301 0.150 0.357
Manuf., Durable Goods 0.359 0.480 0.323 0.468 0.343 0.475
Manuf., Nondurable Goods 0.125 0.331 0.024 0.152 0.081 0.273
Transp., Comm., Utilities 0.040 0.195 0.170 0.375 0.097 0.296
Services 0.080 0.271 0.023 0.151 0.055 0.228
Other Industry 0.067 0.250 0.061 0.239 0.066 0.249
Employer Enrollment (10,000s) 32.353 53.692 27.972 28.107 30.250 44.328
Number of Observations 58,803 45,694 105,178
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics of Control Variables Zocor All Scripts (continued)
Comprehensive HMO and All Plans
and PPO Sample POS Sample Sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
MSA Variables:
Per Cap. Income ($1000s) 25.444 4.293 26.316 4.598 25.863 4.456
Population (100,000s) 1854 2067 2128 2092 1984 2084
MSA Info Unknown 0.212 0.409 0.107 0.309 0.166 0.372
Insurance Variables:
Comprehensive 0.183 0.387 0.000 0.000 0.103 0.303
PPO 0.817 0.387 0.000 0.000 0.457 0.498
HMO 0.000 0.000 0.605 0.489 0.263 0.440
POS 0.000 0.000 0.359 0.480 0.156 0.363
POS w/ Capitation 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.185 0.015 0.123
Prescription Variables:
New Prescription 0.591 0.492 0.526 0.499 0.563 0.496
No DAW 0.674 0.469 0.544 0.498 0.616 0.486
Physician DAW 0.035 0.184 0.034 0.181 0.035 0.183
Patient DAW 0.048 0.214 0.114 0.318 0.077 0.266
Retail Prescription 0.549 0.498 0.530 0.499 0.540 0.498
Mail Order 0.423 0.494 0.362 0.481 0.397 0.489
Mail Status Unknown 0.028 0.165 0.108 0.310 0.063 0.242
Mandatory Drug Subs. 0.217 0.412 0.299 0.458 0.253 0.435
Number of Observations 58,803 45,694 105,178
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Table 1.6: Summary Statistics of Control Variables Neurontin for 30-day Scripts
Comprehensive HMO and All Plans
and PPO Sample POS Sample Sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Demographic Variables:
Age Under 18 0.011 0.104 0.018 0.134 0.013 0.114
Age 18-34 0.059 0.236 0.066 0.248 0.061 0.240
Age 35-44 0.146 0.353 0.178 0.382 0.156 0.363
Age 45-54 0.342 0.474 0.369 0.483 0.351 0.477
Age Over 55 0.442 0.497 0.369 0.482 0.419 0.493
Male 0.360 0.480 0.357 0.479 0.359 0.480
Female 0.640 0.480 0.643 0.479 0.641 0.480
Geographic Variables:
Northeast 0.041 0.198 0.075 0.264 0.051 0.221
North Central 0.285 0.451 0.241 0.427 0.271 0.445
South 0.541 0.498 0.426 0.495 0.506 0.500
West 0.134 0.340 0.258 0.437 0.172 0.377
Urban Indicator 0.685 0.464 0.790 0.408 0.717 0.450
Employment Variables:
Non-Union 0.305 0.461 0.391 0.488 0.332 0.471
Union 0.194 0.396 0.158 0.364 0.183 0.387
Union Unknown 0.500 0.500 0.451 0.498 0.484 0.500
Active FT 0.479 0.500 0.631 0.483 0.526 0.499
Active PT 0.001 0.031 0.008 0.089 0.003 0.056
Retiree 0.195 0.396 0.146 0.353 0.180 0.384
Other Status 0.324 0.468 0.215 0.411 0.291 0.454
Manuf., Durable Goods 0.175 0.380 0.156 0.363 0.169 0.375
Manuf., Nondurable Goods 0.069 0.253 0.026 0.159 0.056 0.230
Transp., Comm., Utilities 0.042 0.201 0.161 0.368 0.078 0.269
Services 0.084 0.277 0.014 0.118 0.062 0.242
Other Industry 0.154 0.361 0.076 0.266 0.132 0.338
Employer Enrollment (10,000s) 51.110 58.941 27.936 29.894 43.931 52.876
Number of Observations 18,393 8,122 26,564
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Table 1.6: Summary Statistics of Control Variables Neurontin for 30-day Scripts
(continued)
Comprehensive HMO and All Plans
and PPO Sample POS Sample Sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
MSA Variables:
Per Cap. Income ($1000s) 23.23 2.593 22.93 2.639 23.14 2.611
Population (100,000s) 1258 1280 1215 1137 1245 1237
MSA Info Unknown 0.315 0.464 0.210 0.408 0.283 0.450
Insurance Variables:
Comprehensive 0.162 0.369 0.000 0.000 0.112 0.316
PPO 0.838 0.369 0.000 0.000 0.580 0.494
HMO 0.000 0.000 0.600 0.490 0.184 0.387
POS 0.000 0.000 0.355 0.479 0.109 0.311
POS w/ Capitation 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.206 0.014 0.116
Prescription Variables:
New Prescription 0.406 0.491 0.359 0.480 0.392 0.488
No DAW 0.818 0.386 0.807 0.395 0.815 0.388
Physician DAW 0.041 0.198 0.046 0.210 0.042 0.202
Patient DAW 0.098 0.298 0.105 0.307 0.101 0.301
Retail Prescription 0.982 0.133 0.945 0.227 0.970 0.170
Mail Order 0.014 0.119 0.011 0.106 0.013 0.115
Mail Status Unknown 0.004 0.060 0.043 0.203 0.016 0.127
Mandatory Drug Subs. 0.130 0.336 0.230 0.421 0.160 0.367
Number of Observations 18,393 8,122 26,564
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Table 1.7: Summary Statistics of Control Variables Neurontin All Scripts
Comprehensive HMO and All Plans
and PPO Sample POS Sample Sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Demographic Variables:
Age Under 18 0.010 0.098 0.016 0.125 0.012 0.108
Age 18-34 0.051 0.219 0.058 0.234 0.053 0.224
Age 35-44 0.130 0.336 0.157 0.364 0.139 0.346
Age 45-54 0.331 0.471 0.358 0.479 0.340 0.474
Age Over 55 0.478 0.500 0.411 0.492 0.457 0.498
Male 0.359 0.480 0.365 0.481 0.361 0.480
Female 0.641 0.480 0.635 0.481 0.639 0.480
Geographic Variables:
Northeast 0.043 0.202 0.087 0.282 0.057 0.231
North Central 0.298 0.457 0.232 0.422 0.277 0.447
South 0.518 0.500 0.411 0.492 0.484 0.500
West 0.141 0.348 0.270 0.444 0.182 0.386
Urban Indicator 0.694 0.461 0.802 0.398 0.729 0.445
Employment Variables:
Non-Union 0.311 0.463 0.399 0.490 0.339 0.473
Union 0.225 0.418 0.175 0.380 0.209 0.407
Union Unknown 0.464 0.499 0.426 0.495 0.451 0.498
Active FT 0.457 0.498 0.608 0.488 0.505 0.500
Active PT 0.001 0.029 0.008 0.087 0.003 0.055
Retiree 0.229 0.420 0.183 0.387 0.214 0.410
Other Status 0.314 0.464 0.201 0.401 0.278 0.448
Manuf., Durable Goods 0.225 0.418 0.189 0.391 0.214 0.410
Manuf., Nondurable Goods 0.087 0.281 0.025 0.157 0.067 0.251
Transp., Comm., Utilities 0.045 0.208 0.174 0.379 0.086 0.280
Services 0.074 0.261 0.011 0.106 0.054 0.226
Other Industry 0.131 0.337 0.076 0.265 0.114 0.318
Employer Enrollment (10,000s) 46.676 57.901 29.308 30.093 41.102 51.373
Number of Observations 23,845 11,099 34,994
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Table 1.7: Summary Statistics of Control Variables Neurontin All Scripts (con-
tinued)
Comprehensive HMO and All Plans
and PPO Sample POS Sample Sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
MSA Variables:
Per Cap. Income ($1000s) 23.19 2.603 22.98 2.679 23.13 2.629
Population (100,000s) 1215 1223 1228 1132 1219 1195
MSA Info Unknown 0.306 0.461 0.198 0.398 0.271 0.445
Insurance Variables:
Comprehensive 0.192 0.394 0.000 0.000 0.131 0.337
PPO 0.808 0.394 0.000 0.000 0.550 0.497
HMO 0.000 0.000 0.563 0.496 0.178 0.383
POS 0.000 0.000 0.386 0.487 0.122 0.328
POS w/ Capitation 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.221 0.016 0.127
Prescription Variables:
New Prescription 0.442 0.497 0.448 0.497 0.444 0.497
No DAW 0.831 0.375 0.786 0.410 0.817 0.387
Physician DAW 0.050 0.218 0.047 0.212 0.049 0.216
Patient DAW 0.084 0.277 0.084 0.277 0.084 0.277
Retail Prescription 0.782 0.413 0.713 0.452 0.760 0.427
Mail Order 0.214 0.410 0.199 0.399 0.209 0.406
Mail Status Unknown 0.004 0.065 0.088 0.283 0.031 0.173
Mandatory Drug Subs. 0.134 0.341 0.231 0.421 0.165 0.371
Number of Observations 23,845 11,099 34,994
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Table 1.8: Summary Statistics of Time to Switch by Drug
Comprehensive HMO and All Plans
and PPO Sample POS Sample Sample
Time to Switch Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Prozac to Fluoxetine:
One Month 0.275 0.446 0.261 0.439 0.269 0.444
Three Months 0.595 0.491 0.604 0.489 0.599 0.490
Zocor to Simvastatin:
One Month 0.066 0.247 0.055 0.227 0.061 0.239
Three Months 0.548 0.498 0.407 0.491 0.486 0.500
Neurontin to Gabapentin:
One Month 0.094 0.292 0.123 0.328 0.103 0.304
Three Months 0.400 0.490 0.451 0.498 0.417 0.493
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Table 1.9: Cost Differentials by Branded Drug for 30-day Scripts
Comprehensive HMO and All Plans
and PPO Sample POS Sample Sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Prozac to Fluoxetine:
OOP CD 0.367 0.375 0.320 0.383 0.346 0.379
TPP CD -0.340 1.353 -0.191 1.327 -0.273 1.344
AWP Prozac 5.216 6.029 5.147 1.272 5.185 4.563
Prozac to Amitriptyline:
OOP CD 0.563 0.515 0.406 0.344 0.496 0.457
TPP CD 3.290 1.210 3.024 0.735 3.180 1.046
AWP Prozac 5.272 1.026 5.194 1.017 5.270 4.959
Zocor to Simvastatin:
OOP CD 0.841 0.826 0.868 0.828 0.854 0.827
TPP CD 0.970 0.934 0.966 0.934 0.968 0.933
AWP Zocor 5.014 0.780 5.770 9.662 5.347 6.404
Neurontin to Gabapentin:
OOP CD 0.335 0.517 0.305 0.495 0.326 0.511
TPP CD 1.947 3.420 1.776 3.474 1.897 3.436
AWP Neurontin 6.432 2.641 6.739 2.844 6.524 2.709
Cost Differentials are calculated by multiplying the unit level by 30.
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Table 1.10: Cost Differentials by Branded Drug for All Scripts
Comprehensive HMO and All Plans
and PPO Sample POS Sample Sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Prozac to Fluoxetine:
OOP CD 0.367 0.375 0.320 0.383 0.346 0.379
TPP CD -0.340 1.353 -0.191 1.327 -0.273 1.344
AWP Prozac 5.216 6.029 5.147 1.272 5.185 4.563
Prozac to Amitriptyline:
OOP CD 0.543 0.525 0.428 0.339 0.491 0.455
TPP CD 3.232 1.200 2.912 0.786 3.089 3.089
AWP Prozac 5.212 6.024 5.140 1.275 5.180 4.559
Zocor to Simvastatin:
OOP CD 0.392 0.673 0.401 0.731 0.397 0.727
TPP CD 0.526 1.204 0.538 1.197 0.531 1.201
AWP Zocor 4.930 0.860 5.320 6.939 5.103 4.626
Neurontin to Gabapentin:
OOP CD 0.242 0.512 0.207 0.490 0.231 0.505
TPP CD 1.932 3.450 1.741 3.456 1.873 3.452
AWP Neurontin 6.375 2.781 6.677 3.069 6.469 2.879
Cost Differentials are calculated at the unit level.
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Table 1.11: 30 Day Cost Differentials by Quartile
Quartile
First Second Third Fourth
Prozac to Fluoxetine:
OOP CD $4.82 $18.41 $18.41 $34.81
TPP CD $-38.57 $-38.57 $33.66 $88.68
AWP Prozac $140.54 $156.09 $167.48 $261.61
Zocor to Simvastatin:
OOP CD $9.99 $19.81 $37.41 $64.77
TPP CD $6.05 $39.07 $46.50 $101.63
AWP Zocor $82.19 $157.45 $158.12 $258.67
Neurontin to Gabapentin:
OOP CD $-4.68 $11.18 $16.85 $48.19
TPP CD $-51.35 $73.14 $124.25 $343.94
AWP Neurontin $141.43 $177.22 $256.40 $388.39
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Table 1.14: Elasticities from Discrete Time Duration Models
Logit LPM
Comp. HMO All Comp. HMO All
& PPO & POS & PPO & POS
Prozac to Fluoxetine
OOP 0.023 -0.030 -0.002 0.014 -0.012 0.002
[0.074] [0.025] [0.041] [0.036] [0.010] [0.020]
TPP 0.045** 0.087** 0.074*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.039***
[0.022] [0.035] [0.026] [0.010] [0.013] [0.010]
Obs. 101,941 69,540 171,484 101,944 69,540 171,484
Zocor to Simvastatin
OOP 0.066*** 0.090*** 0.075*** 0.027*** 0.037** 0.031***
[0.015] [0.033] [0.017] [0.007] [0.015] [0.008]
TPP 0.040*** 0.096*** 0.060*** 0.018*** 0.042*** 0.027***
[0.011] [0.024] [0.012] [0.005] [0.010] [0.005]
Obs. 257,298 239,135 500,726 257,877 239,264 500,825
Neurontin to Gabapentin
OOP 0.063*** 0.023 0.050*** 0.014** 0.004 0.011**
[0.009] [0.015] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005]
TPP -0.109*** -0.119*** -0.112*** -0.077*** -0.061*** -0.073***
[0.025] [0.022] [0.019] [0.016] [0.013] [0.013]
Obs. 113,525 49,209 162,982 113,534 49,259 162,982
Standard errors shown in brackets clustered by employer-plan: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification includes employer fixed effects.
Dependent variable is first switch.
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Table 1.17: LPM Elasticity Estimates Across Employers by Available Plans
One Plan Offered Multiple Plans Offered
Comp. HMO All Comp. HMO All
& PPO & POS & PPO & POS
Prozac to Fluoxetine
OOP N/A 0.218** 0.218** 0.030 0.064** 0.046*
[0.073] [0.073] [0.028] [0.028] [0.024]
TPP N/A 0.055 0.055 0.092*** 0.066*** 0.072***
[0.037] [0.037] [0.016] [0.018] [0.015]
Obs. 0 1,689 1,689 15,472 9,404 24,876
Zocor to Simvastatin
OOP 0.118** 0.013 0.088* 0.008 -0.001 0.027*
[0.054] [0.000] [0.048] [0.013] [0.024] [0.015]
TPP 0.108* 0.027 0.100* -0.002 0.010 0.022
[0.061] [0.000] [0.057] [0.019] [0.036] [0.020]
Obs. 3,566 629 4,195 23,678 20,473 44,486
Neurontin to Gabapentin
OOP -0.043 0.086*** 0.014 0.012 -0.028* -0.003
[0.035] [0.015] [0.050] [0.018] [0.016] [0.013]
TPP -0.125 -0.054* -0.119 -0.067** -0.137*** -0.097***
[0.186] [0.027] [0.138] [0.030] [0.031] [0.028]
Obs. 2,825 923 3,748 15,568 7,199 22,816
Standard errors shown in brackets clustered by employer-plan: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification includes employer fixed effects.
Results shown for switching within one month using the 30-day script sample.
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Chapter 2
Identifying the Effect of the
Tennessee Affordable Drug Act of
2005: Do mandatory generic
substitution laws matter?
2.1 Introduction
Due to publicly-funded healthcare plans, including Medicare and Medicaid, the gov-
ernment accounts for over one-third of prescription drug spending [Dicken et al., 2011].
With rates of prescription drug spending increasing faster than in other areas of healthcare
[Zuvekas et al., 2007], policy-makers continuously strive to decrease these costs. Because
public and private spending on prescription drugs can be reduced through the purchase
of lower-priced generic drugs [Smithet al., 2005], many states have passed laws mandating
that pharmacists substitute branded prescription drugs with their generic equivalents. De-
spite the relative prevalence of these mandatory substitution laws, their effect has not been
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identified. The recent adoption of the Tennessee Affordable Drug Act (TADA) provides
a natural experiment in which we can use a differences-in-differences (DID) estimation
procedure to compare Tennessee (TN) to similar states to estimate the effect of this law.
Generic substitution laws vary by state within the United States, and they have changed
drastically over the course of their history. In the 1940s and 1950s, anti-substitution laws
were the norm. Historically, pharmacists would often substitute the physician-prescribed
branded drugs with inferior quality (or even counterfeit) drugs, so mandates were passed
to end this practice. Laws required pharmacists to provide the exact drug physicians
prescribed regardless of the availability of cheaper, equivalent drugs [Abood, 2008]. In
the 1960s and 1970s, however, opinions began to change as concerns grew over soaring
prescription drug costs. At the same time, there was an influx of Federal Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA)-approved generic drugs to the market. Anti-substitution laws transformed
into permissive substitution laws in almost all states. Permissive substitution laws allow
the pharmacist to choose to substitute the generic drug provided the physician did not
prohibit that action. In some states, these permissive laws further evolved into mandatory
substitution laws, in which a pharmacist must substitute a generic drug for a branded drug,
provided: 1) The generic drug is bio-equivalent to the branded drug. 2) The generic drug
represents a cost savings. 3) The physician has not expressly prohibited the substitution
[Abood, 2008].
During the time period of this study, pharmacists in eleven states were required to sub-
stitute a generic prescription drug for a branded drug: Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington,
and West Virginia [Survey of Pharmacy Law, 2001-2006]. All other states had permissive
substitution laws. During this same time period, six states changed their drug product
substitution (DPS) laws: Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, Vermont, and Tennessee. These
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states all switched to mandatory substitution laws between 2002 and 2005. We analyze
the change of law in TN because we have a large sample of prescription-level data from
TN and comparable control states during 2005.
This mandate could decrease prescription drug expenditures through increased generic
fill rates, or it could have the opposite effect if physicians and patients use DAW indicators
to avoid compliance with the mandate. We use the Thomson Reuters MarketScan® Re-
search Databases to analyze the prescription drug-fills during the six-month periods before
and after the TADA legislation, which enables us to determine the short-term effect of
this legislation. The Commercial database, detailing prescription drug claims, consists of
approximately four million prescription claims in the state of TN in 2005. Additionally, we
consider three control states in our analysis: Georgia (GA), Alabama (AL), and Arkansas
(AR), providing a control group with approximately six million prescription claims. We
include a complete set of demographic, employment-specific, prescription-specific, and
insurance-specific regressors in our model in addition to time trends, state dummy vari-
ables, and interaction terms for state and time variables. We do this to capture any pre-
or post-treatment trend or other state-specific unobservables that could bias our estima-
tion. Our results provide insight into the limited effect of mandatory generic substitution
laws. However, we find that the law discourages patient-directed requests for branded
prescriptions.
2.2 Literature Review
Prescription decisions are affected by both patient and physician preferences. Because
of state laws governing the dispensation of generic drugs, pharmacists also have a role in
determining which prescription drug a patient receives. In this essay, we focus on this
role of the pharmacist and on DPS laws. For a complete review of the influence of the
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patient and physician in the prescription drug decision, please reference the Background
and Literature Review section of the previous essay.
DPS laws exist in every state. When substitution occurs, all DPS laws (regardless of
permissive versus mandatory status) require that pharmacists substitute an equivalent
drug, as identified by the FDA. Additional substitution requirements vary by state. The
TADA of 2005 mandates that the pharmacist dispense a generic drug equivalent to the
branded drug unless prohibited from doing so by the prescribing physician. In order to
prevent generic substitution, the prescribing physician must clearly communicate that
the branded drug should be dispensed by using one of the following annotations on the
written prescription: ‘brand name medically necessary’; ‘dispense as written’; ‘medically
necessary’; ‘brand name’; or ‘no generic’. A pharmacist must heed the directive of the
prescribing physician. Additionally, pharmacists are permitted to dispense the branded
drug if they believe the generic drug will not result in a cost-savings for the patient.
In addition to DPS laws, there are several other factors influencing the pharmacists’
substitution behavior. These include actions prescribers take to prohibit substitution,
requirements for additional record keeping in the case of substitutions, requirements for
cost-savings, pharmacists’ liability, patient consent requirements, and formats of prescrip-
tion forms [Carroll et al., 1987]. Carroll et al. (1987) find that additional record keep-
ing requirements decrease generic substitution, but patient consent requirements increase
generic substitution. Furthermore, they find generic substitution rates vary across states,
depending on the format of the prescription pads doctors use. For example, in some states
physicians use a two-line format, which requires a signature for ‘Drug Product Selection
Permitted’. Carroll et al. (1987) find a lower drug substitution rate when this line appears
at the bottom left-hand-side of the prescription pad versus the bottom right-hand-side.
Regardless of the placement of this signature line, the two-line format results in a lower
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generic substitution rate when compared to a single-line format prescription pad [Car-
roll et al., 1987]. However, a major limitation of this study is that it only represents an
association of generic fill rates with these contributing factors.
A few studies attempt to identify the specific effect of the generic substitution laws on
pharmacists’ dispensing behavior. Shrank et al. (2010) estimate the effect of DPS laws
on generic fill rates for generic Simvastatin after the patent expiration of Zocor. Using a
time series analysis, the authors find increased generic prescription-fills among Medicaid
patients in states where the law requiring patient consent for generic substitution was
removed during the study period. Similarly, Anis (1994) uses panel data methods to
identify the effect of varying drug substitution laws across provinces in Canada, and finds
that mandatory drug substitution laws contribute to generic drug use.
Unfortunately, these existing studies have limitations preventing them from being gen-
eralizable or interpreted across various contexts. The results from Carroll et al. (1987)
identify associations, which cannot be interpreted as causal effects. Shrank et al. (2010)
conduct a limited study of the Medicaid population using one specific drug, which limits
generalizability. The study conducted by Anis (1994) provides meaningful insight, but
cannot be generalized to the United States because of differing laws and healthcare sys-
tems. We expand the current literature by determining if mandatory substitution laws
are effective for the privately insured population.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
We use a trend-break DID approach to isolate the effect of the TADA of 2005. We
accomplish this by comparing the TN prescription drug claims to those in three control
states (GA, AR, and AL) before and after the passage of the TADA of 2005. Our control
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states satisfy two important requirements: prescription drug substitution was permissible
(but not mandatory) and none of these states experienced a pharmacy law change in 2005
[Survey of Pharmacy Law, 2001-2006].
In defining our empirical specification, we consider additional factors that influence pre-
scription drug choice to limit the potential of omitted variable bias. First, we segment our
analysis by type of health insurance plan. The four insurance plan types we consider are
Comprehensive, Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions (HMOs), and Point of Service (POS) plans. Healthier, more price-sensitive patients
tend to choose HMOs versus other insurance plan types [Glied, 2000]. Additionally, drug
formularies, which could influence physician and patient prescription decisions are likely
to vary by health insurance plan type [Frank, 2001]. These factors may contribute to a
finding by Weiner et al. (1994) that patients participating in HMOs have a three to thirty-
three percentage point higher generic fill rate than those participating in fee-for-service
insurance plans. By sub-setting our sample into insurance plan type, we can identify the
effect of the DPS laws on each type of plan, thus limiting unobserved heterogeneity across
plans.
Despite the cost-savings associated with generic drug use [Shrank et al., 2010; Frank,
2001; Leibowitzet al., 1985], patients could potentially prefer branded drugs based on
quality concerns [Suh, 1999; Dubois et al., 2000; Rizzo and Zeckhauser, 2009]. We account
for quality preference through two methods. First, we subset our sample into chronic
and non-chronic prescription drug users. We define chronic prescription drug users as
those individuals who average more than one prescription drug fill per month (within a
therapeutic drug class) during our sample period. We expect that these individuals would
be more concerned with quality than individuals who do not use the prescription drugs
on a regular basis. Our second method of accounting for quality preference is inclusion
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of the dispense as written (DAW) indicators as covariates in our models. Individuals who
specifically request (or have the physician request) the branded drug are choosing the
branded drug regardless of cost or DPS law. We conduct specifications with and without
these indicators because the law could also affect DAW requests.
Of additional concern when conducting DID analyses is omitted variable bias resulting
from other state and time specific policy changes. For example, any Tennessee-specific
shock occurring at the same time as TADA has the potential to bias our estimates. Addi-
tionally, differences in baseline trends across states or shocks in the control states in 2005
could result in biased estimates. We address these concerns in two ways. First, we use
a trend-break DID analysis. In addition to capturing time and state-specific effects, we
include an interaction term for each state and the pre-treatment period. These additions
allow for different baseline trends across states. Second, we conduct falsification tests in
which we arbitrarily change the date of the implementation of the law. A significant effect
of this placebo law on our dependent variable could imply biased estimates arising from
unobservable state- and time-specific factors.
Our empirical approach is
Yist = αPolicyst + βStates + δPret + µState ∗ Prest + λXit + γm + ρj + *j . (2.1)
In equation 2.1, i represents individual presciption-fills, s represents states, t represents
time (before or after the law), and m represents month. Policyst is a binary variable
identifying observations in TN after the passage of TADA. The States variables are binary
values that indicate each of the control states, and Pret is a binary variable set to one if the
observation occurred before TADA and zero if it occurred afterwards. The State ∗ Prest
variables are interaction terms between the control state indicators and the pre-treatment
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indicators, which allow for differences in baseline trends across states. Vector Xit includes
individual control variables related to demographics, geographic location, employment
status, and prescription-specific preferences. In addition to these covariates, we include
month and employer fixed effects (γm and ρj) and a white noise error term (*j). The
principle outcome variable of interest is a generic indicator, which identifies whether or
not a prescription was filled with a generic drug or a branded drug.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Sample Creation
We use the Thomson Reuters MarketScan ® Research Databases as our main data
source. Specifically, the Commercial database provides prescription drug claims by state,
and the Enrollment database provides information detailing insurance plan enrollment.
Together, these data sources provide information regarding demographic characteristics,
geography, employment status, insurance coverage, and payments by prescription claim.
Additionally, we use the 2000 US Census for certain population characteristics at the
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level, including per-capita income and population.
The TADA of 2005 went into effect on June 5, 2005. We include prescription claims
from January 1, 2005 to June 4, 2005 in the pre-law period, and claims from June 5, 2005
to December 31, 2005 in the post-law period. We consider the six months before and after
the law for two reasons. First, we want to ensure our panel is long enough to allow for
prescription-fills after the law, regardless of prescription-fill rate. Second, we want to limit
the potential for biased estimates resulting from the use of too many time periods. In
their review of the accuracy of DID estimates, Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2008)
argue that over-rejection rates increase with increasing time periods. Limiting our time
frame to one year is an attempt to reduce this risk.
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We further decrease our sample size by limiting the sample to only those drugs for which
a generic drug is available. This yields approximately 1.5 million pre-period observations
and 2.1 million post-period observations in TN. The pre-law period contains approximately
2.4 million observations in the state of GA, 320,000 in AL, and 240,000 in AR. The post-
law period includes approximately 3.2 million observations in the state of GA, 400,000 in
AL, and 300,000 in AR1.
As noted in Section 2.3, we subset our analysis by insurance plan type and chronic ver-
sus non-chronic prescription-fill behavior. We consider four health insurance plan types:
Comprehensive, Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), Health Maintenance Organiza-
tion (HMO), and Point of Service (POS). We do not consider POS plans with capitation
because we do not have enough observations from TN identify our model. In order to
determine the relative frequency with which individuals purchase prescription drugs, we
construct a per-month average by therapeutic drug class. Individuals are labeled chronic
users by therapeutic drug class if this average is greater than or equal to one and non-
chronic users (by therapeutic drug class) if this average is less than one.
2.4.2 Sample Characteristics
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show our outcome and control variables by time period and treat-
ment status for the chronic and non-chronic samples, respectively. Across all samples,
approximately 45% of prescriptions are in the pre-period and 55% are in the post-period.
We notice that the demographic and prescription characteristics do not vary widely across
comparison groups or treatment periods. On the contrary, we find variation across the
geographic and employment characteristics. This is expected because these individuals
1The varying sample sizes by state are a product of the data. This data represents contains claims from
large employers only, and there are many more large employers in GA and TN than in AL and AR
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reside in different areas, with varying industries and standards of living. Our control sam-
ple is comprised mostly of observations from GA (80%), which appears to have a larger
concentration of observations from big cities. The control states have a higher average
per capita income and population than TN. Although these characteristics vary across
comparison groups, they do not appear to vary within groups across treatment status.
This provides some assurance that no underlying trend is changing the composition of our
data across time periods.
Summary statistics for the chronic and non-chronic sub-samples are shown in Tables
2.3 and 2.4. The chronic sub-sample is larger than the non-chronic sub-sample across all
insurance plan types. The largest insurance plan sub-sample is PPO; it contains almost
six million observations in the chronic sample and approximately 720,000 observations
in the non-chronic sub-sample. The chronic sub-sample contains an older population
with a higher percentage of females, compared to the non-chronic sub-sample. The geo-
graphic and employment variables are similar across these two sub-samples, but there are
differences within some prescription-specific variables. In particular, the non-chronic sub-
sample has a higher percentage of new prescriptions and fewer physician-initiated DAW
indicators. These summary statistics indicate sufficient differences between samples that
could influence the effectiveness of the DPS law.
Within each sub-sample we find both similarities and differences across insurance plan
type. The HMO plans contain the youngest individuals, while the Comprehensive plans
contain the oldest. However, there does not appear to be selection by gender into various
types of health insurance plans. On the contrary, we see many differences across employ-
ment variables. The Comprehensive plans have a larger number of unionized workers than
the other plans, and also contain the highest number of retirees. Most individuals working
in the manufacturing of durable goods have a Comprehensive plan, while those working in
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transportation, communications, and utilities services most likely have a POS insurance
plan. These differences provide some evidence that insurance plan selection varies across
employer and individual characteristics. We attempt to control for similar differences that
may be unobservable by conducting separate analyses by insurance plan type.
As part of our sensitivity analyses, we identify the effect of the TADA on individual drugs
within the antidepressant class, specifically Prozac and its generic equivalent, Fluoxetine.
In order to ensure our results are not affected by changes in demand for different drugs
over time, we compare our results from the chronic sub-sample analysis to the Prozac
analysis because Prozac is used to treat depression, which is a chronic condition. Summary
statistics for the Prozac-Fluoxetine sub-sample are shown in Table 2.5. There are similar
trends across insurance plans in this sub-sample as in the chronic and non-chronic sub-
samples. This sub-sample has a greater percentage of females than the chronic sub-sample
and most of the individuals are over the age of 45. Less than half of these observations
are for new prescriptions and the majority are filled via retail pharmacy, not through the
mail.
2.4.3 Key Variables
We detail the summary statistics of key variables by sub-sample in Table 2.6. Our
outcome variable, the generic indicator, varies by sub-sample from 87.5% in the non-
chronic Comprehensive sub-sample to 97.2% in the Prozac-Fluoxetine HMO sub-sample.
In general, we see the highest generic usage within the prozac-fluoxetine sub-sample and
lower, but similar generic usage levels, in the chronic and non-chronic sub-samples. When
comparing across insurance plan types, we find the highest generic script usage within the
HMO sub-sample and the lowest within the Comprehensive sub-sample. This is consistent
with HMOs having the most restrictive insurance plans and Comprehensive plans being
the least-restrictive [Glied, 2000].
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Our main variable of interest is the TN*POST variable, which is an interaction term
identifying an observation as being treated by the policy. We find the largest percentage
of our treated observations within the POS sub-samples and the fewest in the Comprehen-
sive sub-samples. This results from the fact that the employers whose data was collected
by Thomson Reuters MarketScan® vary across geographic region and insurance plan of-
ferings. Of the employers in our sample, those based in TN offered more POS plans and
fewer Comprehensive plans.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Primary Results
We use the DID approach identified in equation (2.1) to determine the effect of the
mandatory generic drug substitution law on the probability of individuals filling their
prescription with a generic drug. The coefficients from the LPM regressions for the chronic
and non-chronic samples by insurance plan are listed in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. In the chronic
sub-sample, we find the DPS law increases the probability of a generic prescription by 0.006
percentage points among individuals with the HMO insurance plan, which corresponds to
a 0.62% increase. We do not find the law to have a significant effect on generic prescription-
fills within any other insurance sub-sample. Within the non-chronic sub-sample, we find
statistically significant and positive effects of the law on the PPO and POS sub-samples.
Those individuals in a PPO are 0.005 percentage points more likely to receive the generic
prescription as a results of the law, while those in the POS plans are 0.014 percentage
points more likely. This corresponds to an increase of 0.54% and 1.5%, respectively. We
find the largest effect within the non-chronic subsample in part because these individuals
use the drugs less frequently and may have fewer concerns about potential side-effect
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differences between the branded and generic drug2.
Because we do not find a relatively large or consistent effect of this law change across
insurance plan types, we assess the effect of this law on DAW indicators3. Patients may
be avoiding this mandate by requesting the branded drug from their physician. Physicians
can override the DPS law by noting that the brand is medically necessary. Table A.3 shows
the effect of the TADA of 2005 on the physician DAW indicator and the patient DAW
indicator. The outcome variable in the first panel is an indicator detailing whether or not
the physician required the branded drug be dispensed. We find no significant effects within
the chronic or non-chronic sub-samples. However, in the second panel we find statistically
significant negative effects of the law on patient’s request for the branded drug. As a
result of the law, patients may believe that they are not capable of overriding the generic
substitution, therefore patient-initiated requests decrease.
To further understand how the DAW indicators are affecting the generic prescription-fills
when the mandatory DPS law takes effect, we remove the DAW indicators from our original
regression. Tables 2.10 contain the estimates on our variable of interest, TN*POST, for
the chronic and non-chronic sample. For ease of comparison, the first and third panels
in this table contain the results from our initial specification (for each sub-sample). We
notice larger effects in most cases of the specification without the DAW indicators. This
implies that the DAW indicators have a negative effect on generic substitution, which is
smaller in magnitude than the positive effect of the law.
2We also conduct specifications using only observations from GA in the control group. We estimate
similar effects in this specification, but the statistical precision of the estimates varies across insurance
categories.
3We have a large sample, which mitigates concerns that there is limited statistical power.
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We also note that compliance with DAW directives is not 100%. Within our sample,
approximately 18% of prescriptions with physician DAW indications and 23% of prescrip-
tions with patient DAW indications are filled with generic drugs. These proportions remain
relatively stable during the pre and post time periods. Before the law 19% of prescrip-
tions with physician DAW indications were filled with generics and after the law this also
dropped slightly to 17%. Similarly, 23.8% of prescriptions with patient DAW indications
were filled with generic drugs before the law and this dropped slightly to 22.4% after the
law. If there were more regulation over compliance with DAW directives, the effect of the
TADA would be muted.
2.5.2 Sensitivity Results
In addition to the separate analyses by insurance plan type, we conduct an analysis using
only Prozac and Fluoxetine. Past research indicates that consumers have varying concerns
over drug efficacy, side-effect, and quality depending on the severity of the condition the
drug treats [Dubois et al., 2000]. For this reason, consumers may have different branded
or generic drug preferences across drug classifications. Additionally, we want to ensure our
positive results are not confounded by individuals increasing their volume of generic drug
use for other reasons, as opposed to switching between branded and generic equivalents.
We compare these results with our results from the chronic sample, as individuals using
Prozac or Fluoxetine are likely to use these drugs consistently for a certain period of time.
The first panel in Table 2.11 displays the results from our initial regression using the
chronic sub-sample, and the second panel shows our results from the Prozac-Fluoxetine
sub-sample. We continue to find positive and statistically significant effects of the law
on the generic prescription-fills within the HMO insurance plan type. The law increases
the probability of receiving Fluoxetine by 0.006 percentage points, which corresponds to
an increase of 0.59%. This is consistent with our results from the chronic sub-sample in
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which the law increased the probability of generic prescription-fills by 0.62%.
We conduct two additional sensitivity analyses to determine the robustness of our results
to issues of omitted variable bias and serial correlation. In order to assure that our
results are not capturing the effect of potential unobservables that occur simultaneously,
we conduct falsification tests by introducing a placebo law six months prior to and six
months after the actual DPS law was implemented. If we find an effect of this placebo,
it could indicate an error in our specification. Lastly, we use a method suggested by
Bertrand et al. (2008) to determine if our standard errors are underestimated due to serial
correlation. Bertrand et al. (2008) highlight and identify the three factors contributing to
serial correlation in DID models: long time series data, highly positively serially correlated
dependent variables, and low variation in the treatment variable over time [Bertrand et al.,
2008]. We test our model by aggregating our data into two time periods, thus removing
serial correlation from the data.
The results of our falsification tests are detailed in panels three and four of Tables 2.12
and 2.13. We do not find any statistically significant effects of our placebo laws on the
probability of a generic prescription-fill. This provides some supportive evidence to the
robustness of our specification.
In order to address the potential issue of serial correlation, we aggregate our data into
pre- and post-treatment time periods. We collapse our key variables (TN*POST, indi-
cators for each state, and indicators for pre-treatment trends for these states) by state,
treatment period, and chronic script status; this yields a sample size of 8 for each sub-
sample and 16 for the entire group. The marginal effects from our LPM regression on
these averaged variables are listed in Table 2.14. We find a positive, but insignificant,
effect of the law on the generic prescription-fill. This indicates that there may be some
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serial correlation biasing our standard errors downward. However, because of our small
number of groups (i.e. four groups–one treated and three controls) these results should be
interpreted with caution [Bertrand et al., 2008].
2.6 Conclusions
In general, we find a very limited effect of the mandatory generic drug substitution
law on generic prescription-fills in TN. The law results in a 0.54%—1.5% increase in the
probability of generic prescription-fill; this effect is largest for non-chronic prescription
drug users with POS insurance plans. It is important to note that all of the control states
allow pharmacists to dispense generic drugs under permissive drug produce substitution
laws. The lack of consistent and large effects of this law could imply that much of the
substitution happened under the permissive law. Therefore, mandating the substitution
produces only limited increases in generic prescription-fills. There is no evidence that
patients or physicians are seeking to avoid this mandate by increasing their use of dispense
as written directives. On the contrary, we find patient-intitiated requests for the branded
drug decrease with the passage of this law.
Our results have implications for policy makers. In the transition from permissive to
mandatory DPS laws, we do not find large effects, hence, mandatory DPS laws should not
be implemented as a means of reducing drug expenditures. Other methods of reducing
drug expenditures (i.e. cost-sharing changes suggested in the first essay) will likely have
a larger influence and should be considered above changes in DPS laws.
Our study is limited to the mandatory drug substitution law passed in Tennessee in
2005, and our results are not necessarily generalizable to other populations or regions.
Further research could extend this analysis to other DPS laws to determine the robustness
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of these findings; however, we expect more recent law changes to have an even smaller
influence on generic prescription fills. Due to the recent consolidation of large Pharmacy
Benefit Managers (PBMs), pharmacists have an increased incentive to promote generic
drug substitution whenever available, as generic drugs represent a higher profit-margin.
This further suggests that initial permissive substitution laws will continue to have a
larger influence on drug substitution in contrast to mandatory DPS laws. One additional
limitation of our data is that only considers individuals with private insurance who are
employed at large corporations, which could further limit the generalizability of our results.
2.7 Tables
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Control Variables for Chronic Sub-sample by Time
Period
Tennessee Control States
Pre Law Post Law Pre Law Post Law
Mean S.D Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Demographic Variables:
Age Under 18 0.057 0.233 0.052 0.222 0.070 0.255 0.064 0.245
Age 18-34 0.139 0.346 0.135 0.342 0.140 0.347 0.134 0.341
Age 35-44 0.170 0.376 0.169 0.375 0.169 0.374 0.167 0.373
Age 45-54 0.302 0.459 0.303 0.460 0.284 0.451 0.285 0.452
Age Over 55 0.331 0.471 0.340 0.474 0.337 0.473 0.349 0.477
Male 0.342 0.474 0.342 0.474 0.333 0.471 0.334 0.472
Female 0.658 0.474 0.658 0.474 0.667 0.471 0.666 0.472
Geographic Variables:
AL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.108 0.311 0.104 0.305
AK 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.079 0.270 0.077 0.266
GA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.813 0.390 0.819 0.385
TN 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Urban 0.681 0.466 0.683 0.465 0.715 0.452 0.716 0.451
Employment Variables:
Union 0.086 0.280 0.089 0.285 0.082 0.275 0.080 0.271
Non-Union 0.831 0.375 0.827 0.379 0.211 0.408 0.213 0.410
Union Unknown 0.083 0.276 0.084 0.278 0.707 0.455 0.707 0.455
Active FT 0.765 0.424 0.763 0.425 0.715 0.452 0.710 0.454
Active PT 0.015 0.123 0.016 0.125 0.003 0.051 0.002 0.049
Retiree 0.071 0.257 0.070 0.255 0.171 0.377 0.177 0.382
Other Status 0.149 0.356 0.150 0.357 0.112 0.315 0.111 0.314
Manuf., Durable 0.117 0.322 0.121 0.326 0.097 0.296 0.095 0.294
Manuf., Nondurable 0.084 0.278 0.081 0.273 0.052 0.223 0.051 0.220
Transp., Comm., Utilities 0.083 0.276 0.084 0.278 0.039 0.194 0.039 0.193
Services 0.031 0.173 0.033 0.179 0.019 0.136 0.020 0.140
Other Industry 0.072 0.259 0.075 0.263 0.103 0.303 0.105 0.306
Number of Observations 1,449,562 1,921,513 2,598,052 3,443,929
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Control Variables for Chronic Sub-sample by Time Period
(continued)
Tennessee Control States
Pre Law Post Law Pre Law Post Law
Mean S.D Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
MSA Variables:
Per Cap. Income ($1000s) 23.173 2.423 23.185 2.418 24.423 3.622 24.432 3.625
Population (100,000s) 8.742 4.883 8.768 4.895 24.910 22.672 25.189 22.688
MSA Info Unknown 0.319 0.466 0.317 0.465 0.285 0.452 0.284 0.451
Prescription Variables:
Generic Indicator 0.904 0.294 0.918 0.275 0.895 0.307 0.912 0.283
New Prescription 0.560 0.496 0.547 0.498 0.603 0.489 0.592 0.492
No DAW 0.912 0.283 0.922 0.267 0.920 0.271 0.931 0.253
Physician DAW 0.039 0.194 0.039 0.193 0.014 0.119 0.015 0.121
Patient DAW 0.037 0.188 0.029 0.168 0.024 0.154 0.023 0.149
Retail Prescription 0.936 0.245 0.935 0.246 0.841 0.366 0.840 0.366
Mail Order 0.064 0.244 0.064 0.245 0.037 0.190 0.038 0.191
Mail Unknown 0.000 0.021 0.001 0.025 0.122 0.327 0.122 0.327
Number of Observations 1,449,562 1,921,513 2,598,052 3,443,929
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Control Variables for Non-chronic Sub-sample by
Time Period
Tennessee Control States
Pre Law Post Law Pre Law Post Law
Mean S.D Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Demographic Variables:
Age Under 18 0.238 0.426 0.200 0.400 0.260 0.438 0.220 0.414
Age 18-34 0.154 0.361 0.157 0.364 0.169 0.375 0.165 0.371
Age 35-44 0.157 0.363 0.157 0.363 0.167 0.373 0.167 0.373
Age 45-54 0.236 0.425 0.247 0.431 0.210 0.407 0.223 0.416
Age Over 55 0.215 0.411 0.240 0.427 0.194 0.395 0.224 0.417
Male 0.442 0.497 0.433 0.495 0.415 0.493 0.411 0.492
Female 0.558 0.497 0.567 0.495 0.585 0.493 0.589 0.492
Geographic Variables:
AL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.096 0.295 0.099 0.298
AK 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.089 0.285 0.099 0.299
GA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.815 0.389 0.802 0.398
TN 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Urban 0.681 0.466 0.683 0.465 0.715 0.452 0.716 0.451
Employment Variables:
Union 0.085 0.279 0.084 0.277 0.056 0.229 0.056 0.230
Non-Union 0.825 0.380 0.827 0.378 0.241 0.428 0.258 0.438
Union Unknown 0.089 0.285 0.089 0.285 0.703 0.457 0.686 0.464
Active FT 0.821 0.383 0.814 0.389 0.804 0.397 0.790 0.407
Active PT 0.019 0.138 0.018 0.135 0.003 0.056 0.003 0.057
Retiree 0.053 0.225 0.055 0.228 0.084 0.277 0.097 0.296
Other Status 0.106 0.308 0.113 0.316 0.109 0.312 0.110 0.313
Manuf., Durable 0.123 0.328 0.119 0.324 0.084 0.278 0.080 0.272
Manuf., Nondurable 0.113 0.316 0.097 0.296 0.053 0.224 0.051 0.219
Transp., Comm., Utilities 0.090 0.286 0.093 0.291 0.043 0.204 0.044 0.206
Services 0.037 0.188 0.033 0.179 0.022 0.146 0.019 0.137
Other Industry 0.092 0.289 0.105 0.307 0.113 0.317 0.139 0.346
Number of Observations 181,470 204,636 364,519 411,053
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Control Variables for Non-chronic Sub-sample by Time
Period (continued)
Tennessee Control States
Pre Law Post Law Pre Law Post Law
Mean S.D Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
MSA Variables:
Per Cap. Income ($1000s) 23.047 2.472 23.098 2.434 24.647 3.558 24.501 3.582
Population (100,000s) 8.637 4.935 8.699 4.908 26.177 22.641 25.398 22.634
MSA Info Unknown 0.307 0.461 0.311 0.463 0.266 0.442 0.272 0.445
Prescription Variables:
Generic Indicator 0.905 0.293 0.917 0.275 0.901 0.299 0.915 0.279
New Prescription 0.673 0.469 0.631 0.483 0.737 0.440 0.689 0.463
No DAW 0.924 0.265 0.931 0.253 0.937 0.242 0.941 0.235
Physician DAW 0.035 0.184 0.036 0.187 0.010 0.100 0.011 0.107
Patient DAW 0.027 0.163 0.022 0.146 0.019 0.137 0.018 0.135
Retail Prescription 0.941 0.235 0.932 0.251 0.797 0.402 0.829 0.376
Mail Order 0.058 0.234 0.067 0.250 0.028 0.166 0.034 0.180
Mail Unknown 0.000 0.022 0.001 0.024 0.175 0.380 0.344 0.000
Number of Observations 181,470 204,636 364,519 411,053
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics of Control Variables for Chronic Sub-sample
Comp. PPO HMO POS
Mean S.D Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Demographic Variables:
Age Under 18 0.026 0.158 0.056 0.229 0.086 0.280 0.072 0.258
Age 18-34 0.047 0.213 0.123 0.328 0.183 0.387 0.174 0.379
Age 35-44 0.064 0.245 0.156 0.363 0.214 0.410 0.204 0.403
Age 45-54 0.229 0.420 0.297 0.457 0.290 0.454 0.295 0.456
Age Over 55 0.634 0.482 0.369 0.483 0.227 0.419 0.255 0.436
Male 0.324 0.468 0.340 0.474 0.321 0.467 0.348 0.476
Female 0.676 0.468 0.660 0.474 0.679 0.467 0.652 0.476
Geographic Variables:
AL 0.103 0.304 0.089 0.285 0.005 0.073 0.048 0.213
AK 0.064 0.244 0.069 0.254 0.003 0.057 0.020 0.142
GA 0.654 0.476 0.519 0.500 0.731 0.443 0.133 0.340
TN 0.179 0.383 0.323 0.468 0.260 0.439 0.798 0.401
Urban 0.712 0.453 0.659 0.474 0.824 0.381 0.723 0.447
Employment Variables:
Union 0.346 0.476 0.089 0.285 0.000 0.022 0.073 0.260
Non-Union 0.193 0.394 0.409 0.492 0.274 0.446 0.914 0.280
Union Unknown 0.462 0.499 0.502 0.500 0.725 0.446 0.013 0.114
Active FT 0.368 0.482 0.681 0.466 0.927 0.260 0.820 0.384
Active PT 0.002 0.046 0.001 0.035 0.000 0.016 0.054 0.227
Retiree 0.539 0.499 0.143 0.350 0.042 0.201 0.084 0.278
Other Status 0.091 0.288 0.174 0.379 0.031 0.172 0.041 0.199
Manuf., Durable 0.396 0.489 0.109 0.312 0.014 0.118 0.083 0.275
Manuf., Nondurable 0.053 0.224 0.093 0.290 0.001 0.032 0.012 0.110
Trans., Comm., Utilities 0.074 0.262 0.006 0.077 0.018 0.133 0.364 0.481
Services 0.004 0.064 0.034 0.180 0.005 0.072 0.013 0.115
Other Industry 0.022 0.146 0.131 0.337 0.025 0.157 0.020 0.140
Emp. Enroll. (10,000s) 8.909 10.196 45.330 50.655 24.267 11.040 14.290 7.718
Number of Observations 509,150 5,935,537 1,870,612 1,097,757
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics of Control Variables for Chronic Sub-sample (continued)
Comp. PPO HMO POS
Mean S.D Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
MSA Variables:
Per Cap. Income ($1000s) 24.193 3.547 23.496 3.385 25.246 3.061 23.837 2.541
Population (100,000s) 22.595 21.975 16.379 19.281 27.901 21.324 15.605 14.728
MSA Info Unknown 0.288 0.453 0.341 0.474 0.176 0.381 0.277 0.447
Prescription Variables:
New Prescription 0.523 0.499 0.521 0.500 0.751 0.432 0.640 0.480
No DAW 0.098 0.297 0.084 0.277 0.049 0.215 0.074 0.261
Physician DAW 0.024 0.153 0.024 0.154 0.014 0.119 0.032 0.176
Patient DAW 0.022 0.145 0.027 0.162 0.023 0.151 0.033 0.178
Retail Prescription 0.827 0.378 0.955 0.208 0.595 0.491 0.940 0.238
Mail Order 0.170 0.375 0.045 0.206 0.011 0.105 0.060 0.238
Mail Unknown 0.003 0.054 0.001 0.029 0.394 0.489 0.000 0.008
Number of Observations 509,150 5,935,537 1,870,612 1,097,757
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics of Control Variables for Non-chronic Sub-sample
Comp. PPO HMO POS
Mean S.D Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Demographic Variables:
Age Under 18 0.121 0.326 0.210 0.407 0.289 0.453 0.265 0.441
Age 18-34 0.079 0.269 0.154 0.361 0.194 0.395 0.180 0.384
Age 35-44 0.079 0.269 0.159 0.366 0.182 0.386 0.176 0.381
Age 45-54 0.209 0.407 0.239 0.426 0.199 0.400 0.213 0.409
Age Over 55 0.512 0.500 0.238 0.426 0.135 0.342 0.167 0.373
Male 0.418 0.493 0.419 0.493 0.407 0.491 0.456 0.498
Female 0.582 0.493 0.581 0.493 0.593 0.491 0.544 0.498
Geographic Variables:
AL 0.101 0.302 0.088 0.283 0.005 0.070 0.052 0.223
AK 0.064 0.245 0.094 0.291 0.004 0.061 0.022 0.148
GA 0.664 0.473 0.504 0.500 0.815 0.388 0.158 0.365
TN 0.171 0.377 0.314 0.464 0.176 0.381 0.767 0.423
Urban 0.750 0.433 0.668 0.471 0.833 0.373 0.732 0.443
Employment Variables:
Union 0.268 0.443 0.077 0.266 0.000 0.016 0.064 0.245
Non-Union 0.224 0.417 0.443 0.497 0.193 0.395 0.922 0.269
Union Status Unknown 0.508 0.500 0.480 0.500 0.807 0.395 0.014 0.118
Active FT 0.519 0.500 0.753 0.431 0.955 0.206 0.856 0.351
Active PT 0.006 0.074 0.001 0.038 0.000 0.019 0.060 0.238
Retiree 0.408 0.492 0.080 0.272 0.028 0.164 0.063 0.243
Other Status 0.067 0.250 0.165 0.371 0.016 0.127 0.021 0.143
Manuf., Durable 0.342 0.474 0.110 0.313 0.007 0.084 0.087 0.282
Manuf., Nondurable 0.050 0.217 0.106 0.308 0.000 0.008 0.018 0.134
Trans., Comm., Utilities 0.084 0.277 0.008 0.087 0.023 0.150 0.370 0.483
Services 0.005 0.067 0.034 0.180 0.007 0.083 0.021 0.143
Other Industry 0.022 0.147 0.172 0.377 0.025 0.155 0.025 0.156
Emp. Enroll. (10,000s) 8.072 9.667 50.731 53.680 26.141 10.140 14.213 7.953
Number of Observations 43,341 718,427 260,667 139,243
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics of Control Variables for Non-chronic Sub-sample (continued)
Comp. PPO HMO POS
Mean S.D Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
MSA Variables:
Per Cap. Income ($1000s) 24.066 3.554 23.424 3.366 25.528 3.044 23.991 2.587
Population (100,000s) 21.860 21.899 15.963 19.114 30.631 21.249 16.785 15.659
MSA Info Unknown 0.250 0.433 0.332 0.471 0.167 0.373 0.268 0.443
Prescription Variables:
New Prescription 0.591 0.492 0.626 0.484 0.857 0.350 0.748 0.434
No DAW 0.902 0.297 0.916 0.278 0.951 0.215 0.926 0.261
Physician DAW 0.018 0.133 0.021 0.143 0.010 0.099 0.027 0.161
Patient DAW 0.018 0.133 0.022 0.146 0.015 0.122 0.025 0.157
Retail Prescription 0.848 0.359 0.956 0.206 0.528 0.499 0.945 0.227
Mail Order 0.151 0.358 0.043 0.204 0.008 0.087 0.055 0.227
Mail Unknown 0.001 0.038 0.001 0.028 0.464 0.499 0.000 0.005
Number of Observations 43,341 718,427 260,667 139,243
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics of Control Variables for Prozac-Fluoxetine Sub-sample
Comp. PPO HMO POS
Mean S.D Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Demographic Variables:
Age Under 18 0.032 0.177 0.034 0.182 0.046 0.210 0.052 0.223
Age 18-34 0.053 0.224 0.115 0.319 0.165 0.371 0.155 0.362
Age 35-44 0.090 0.286 0.196 0.397 0.272 0.445 0.251 0.433
Age 45-54 0.273 0.446 0.343 0.475 0.324 0.468 0.320 0.466
Age Over 55 0.552 0.497 0.312 0.463 0.193 0.395 0.222 0.416
Male 0.221 0.415 0.212 0.409 0.201 0.401 0.228 0.420
Female 0.779 0.415 0.788 0.409 0.799 0.401 0.772 0.420
Geographic Variables:
AL 0.072 0.259 0.066 0.248 0.004 0.063 0.048 0.215
AK 0.052 0.223 0.062 0.242 0.002 0.047 0.020 0.142
GA 0.720 0.449 0.547 0.498 0.706 0.456 0.148 0.355
TN 0.155 0.362 0.325 0.468 0.288 0.453 0.783 0.412
Urban Indicator 0.729 0.444 0.686 0.464 0.830 0.375 0.744 0.436
Employment Variables:
Union 0.223 0.416 0.056 0.230 0.000 0.012 0.047 0.212
Non-Union 0.183 0.387 0.397 0.489 0.302 0.459 0.940 0.237
Union Unknown 0.594 0.491 0.547 0.498 0.698 0.459 0.013 0.112
Active FT 0.461 0.499 0.704 0.456 0.936 0.244 0.851 0.356
Active PT 0.002 0.041 0.002 0.039 0.000 0.011 0.027 0.161
Retiree 0.450 0.498 0.126 0.332 0.035 0.185 0.076 0.265
Other Status 0.086 0.281 0.168 0.374 0.028 0.166 0.046 0.209
Manuf., Durable 0.277 0.448 0.081 0.273 0.012 0.110 0.053 0.223
Manuf., Nondurable 0.044 0.205 0.083 0.276 0.002 0.044 0.020 0.138
Trans., Comm., Utilities 0.069 0.254 0.006 0.077 0.018 0.132 0.309 0.462
Services 0.004 0.064 0.035 0.184 0.003 0.055 0.018 0.135
Other Industry 0.022 0.147 0.124 0.330 0.022 0.146 0.018 0.131
Emp. Enroll. (10,000s) 7.307 9.442 45.753 49.897 23.669 11.145 13.239 7.035
Number of Observations 7,888 96,366 33,136 17,380
80
2.7. TABLES
Table 2.5: Summary Statistics of Control Variables for Prozac-Fluoxetine Sub-sample (con-
tinued)
Comp. PPO HMO POS
Mean S.D Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
MSA Variables:
Per Cap. Income ($1000s) 24.319 3.556 23.753 3.416 25.255 3.075 23.737 2.720
Population (100,000s) 23.810 22.282 18.059 20.029 27.854 21.436 15.252 15.668
MSA Info Unknown 0.271 0.444 0.314 0.464 0.170 0.375 0.256 0.436
Prescription Variables:
New Prescription 0.357 0.479 0.327 0.469 0.618 0.486 0.416 0.493
No DAW 0.898 0.302 0.927 0.259 0.967 0.187 0.938 0.241
Physician DAW 0.040 0.196 0.031 0.173 0.017 0.128 0.024 0.153
Patient DAW 0.024 0.152 0.016 0.125 0.007 0.085 0.020 0.140
Retail Prescription 0.803 0.398 0.941 0.236 0.594 0.491 0.914 0.280
Mail Order 0.195 0.396 0.059 0.235 0.015 0.123 0.086 0.280
Mail Unknown 0.002 0.039 0.000 0.022 0.391 0.488 0.000 0.000
Number of Observations 7,888 96,366 33,136 17,380
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Table 2.6: Summary Statistics of Key Variables by Sample
Comp. PPO HMO POS
Mean S.D Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Chronic Sub-sample:
Generic Indicator 0.884 0.321 0.905 0.293 0.918 0.274 0.914 0.281
TN*POST 0.100 0.300 0.183 0.387 0.147 0.354 0.447 0.497
Pre Law 0.443 0.497 0.433 0.495 0.414 0.493 0.438 0.496
AL Pre Law 0.044 0.204 0.039 0.194 0.002 0.047 0.021 0.142
GA Pre Law 0.293 0.455 0.224 0.417 0.298 0.457 0.057 0.232
AK Pre Law 0.028 0.164 0.030 0.171 0.001 0.037 0.009 0.094
Number of Observations 509,150 5,935,537 1,870,612 1,097,757
Non-chronic Sub-sample:
Generic Indicator 0.875 0.331 0.908 0.290 0.918 0.274 0.915 0.279
TN*POST 0.094 0.292 0.167 0.373 0.093 0.291 0.405 0.491
Pre Law 0.447 0.497 0.464 0.499 0.484 0.500 0.473 0.499
AL Pre Law 0.045 0.208 0.041 0.197 0.002 0.049 0.025 0.155
GA Pre Law 0.294 0.456 0.234 0.424 0.397 0.489 0.076 0.264
AK Pre Law 0.030 0.171 0.041 0.199 0.002 0.043 0.010 0.102
Number of Observations 43,341 718,427 260,667 139,243
Prozac-Fluoxetine Sub-sample:
Generic Indicator 0.940 0.237 0.960 0.196 0.972 0.165 0.966 0.180
TN*POST 0.085 0.279 0.180 0.384 0.163 0.369 0.437 0.496
Pre Law 0.451 0.498 0.427 0.495 0.416 0.493 0.438 0.496
AL Pre Law 0.031 0.175 0.028 0.166 0.001 0.036 0.019 0.136
GA Pre Law 0.325 0.468 0.227 0.419 0.288 0.453 0.063 0.243
AK Pre Law 0.024 0.153 0.026 0.161 0.001 0.032 0.010 0.099
Number of Observations 7,888 96,366 33,136 17,380
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Table 2.7: LPM Regression Estimates for Chronic Sub-sample
Comp. PPO HMO POS
TN*Post -0.003 -0.000 0.006** -0.000
[0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
Pre Law 0.004 0.007 0.007** 0.000
[0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003]
AL Pre 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004]
GA Pre -0.006 -0.013** -0.011*** 0.002
[0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003]
AL -0.002 -0.008*** 0.006 -0.000
[0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
AK -0.006*** -0.011*** -0.007 -0.004
[0.003] [0.003] [0.010] [0.004]
GA -0.004 -0.004 0.005 0.008
[0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.008]
Age Between 18-34 0.011*** 0.010** 0.003*** 0.014***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.001] [0.002]
Age Between 35-44 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.005 0.010***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
Age Begween 45-54 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.002 0.012***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.006] [0.003]
Age Over 55 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.003 0.016***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003]
Male 0.035*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.015***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.001]
MSA Population (100,000s) -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Employer Enrollment -0.002*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.007***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
MSA Per Capita Income (1000s) 0.001* 0.001 -0.000 0.003***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
Urban -0.036** -0.019 0.008 -0.067***
[0.017] [0.015] [0.035] [0.009]
Union 0.010*** 0.002 -0.021 0.010**
[0.002] [0.003] [0.018] [0.004]
Union Status Unknown -0.009 0.011 0.012 -0.005
[0.027] [0.008] [0.010] [0.004]
Standard errors shown in brackets clustered by employer: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification includes employer and time fixed effects.
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Table 2.7: LPM Regression Estimates for Chronic Sub-sample (continued)
Comp. PPO HMO POS
Active Full Time -0.019*** -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.007***
[0.005] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Active Part Time or Seasonal 0.018*** -0.009*** -0.009* 0.006**
[0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002]
Retiree -0.006 -0.003*** -0.006** -0.007**
[0.008] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003]
Manufacturing, Durable Goods -0.079*** -0.031*** -0.250*** -0.027***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.046] [0.003]
Manufacturing, Nondurable Goods -0.093*** -0.021*** 0.219***
[0.008] [0.007] [0.015]
Transportation, Communiation, Utilities -0.112*** -0.073*** 0.010 -0.030***
[0.007] [0.015] [0.010] [0.004]
Other Industry -0.085*** -0.023*** -0.060*** -0.030***
[0.005] [0.003] [0.011] [0.005]
New Prescription 0.034** 0.032*** 0.014*** 0.012***
[0.013] [0.009] [0.000] [0.002]
Physician DAW -0.781*** -0.763*** -0.783*** -0.760***
[0.023] [0.014] [0.041] [0.025]
Patient DAW -0.660*** -0.696*** -0.778*** -0.771***
[0.128] [0.076] [0.035] [0.052]
Mail Order -0.074*** -0.025 -0.029*** -0.030
[0.009] [0.015] [0.008] [0.024]
Mail Order Status Unknown -0.087*** -0.005 -0.050*** -0.009
[0.014] [0.005] [0.003] [0.007]
Observations 509,150 5,935,537 1,870,612 1,097,757
Standard errors shown in brackets clustered by employer-plan: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification includes employer and time fixed effects.
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Table 2.8: LPM Regression Estimates for Non-chronic Sub-sample
Comp. PPO HMO POS
TN*Post -0.007 0.005*** -0.005 0.014***
[0.006] [0.002] [0.005] [0.003]
Pre Law -0.010 0.009** 0.005 0.011*
[0.009] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006]
AL Pre -0.013 -0.012** -0.017 -0.006
[0.009] [0.006] [0.014] [0.008]
GA Pre 0.001 -0.014*** 0.004 -0.010**
[0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
AL 0.005 -0.003 0.008 0.018
[0.010] [0.005] [0.015] [0.014]
AK -0.021* -0.006* -0.043** 0.011
[0.010] [0.003] [0.017] [0.009]
GA -0.007 0.001 -0.019*** 0.018**
[0.008] [0.004] [0.007] [0.008]
Age Between 18-34 0.016 0.005** -0.015*** -0.002
[0.011] [0.002] [0.003] [0.007]
Age Between 35-44 0.019** 0.006*** -0.009* 0.000
[0.009] [0.002] [0.005] [0.006]
Age Begween 45-54 0.001 0.002 -0.014*** 0.000
[0.009] [0.002] [0.005] [0.008]
Age Over 55 -0.004 0.009*** -0.012 0.006
[0.013] [0.003] [0.009] [0.005]
Male 0.052*** 0.029*** 0.021*** 0.018***
[0.011] [0.005] [0.002] [0.004]
MSA Population (100,000s) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Employer Enrollment -0.002 0.000*** 0.001*** -0.003***
[0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
MSA Per Capita Income (1000s) 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Urban -0.053 -0.015 0.024
[0.037] [0.025] [0.035]
Union 0.022*** 0.007 0.159*** 0.011
[0.007] [0.005] [0.051] [0.006]
Union Status Unknown -0.090** 0.042*** 0.075*** 0.015*
[0.043] [0.009] [0.016] [0.008]
Standard errors shown in brackets clustered by employer: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification includes employer and time fixed effects.
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Table 2.8: LPM Regression Estimates for Non-chronic Sub-sample (continued)
Comp. PPO HMO POS
Active Full Time -0.015 0.001 -0.007 -0.023***
[0.021] [0.004] [0.010] [0.004]
Active Part Time or Seasonal -0.004 -0.009 -0.010 -0.014***
[0.026] [0.008] [0.008] [0.004]
Retiree 0.002 -0.009 -0.019 -0.023***
[0.014] [0.008] [0.013] [0.008]
Manufacturing, Durable Goods -0.0392** 0.095*** 0.127*** 0.111***
[0.016] [0.006] [0.020] [0.008]
Manufacturing, Nondurable Goods 0.059 0.116***
[0.063] [0.010]
Transportation, Communiation, Utilities -0.004 0.115*** 0.197*** 0.087***
[0.012] [0.010] [0.013] [0.010]
Other Industry -0.059*** 0.077*** -0.124*** 0.119***
[0.012] [0.008] [0.013] [0.009]
New Prescription 0.059*** 0.045*** 0.018*** 0.019***
[0.019] [0.013] [0.002] [0.004]
Physician DAW -0.746*** -0.753*** -0.756*** -0.743***
[0.030] [0.018] [0.044] [0.015]
Patient DAW -0.549*** -0.676*** -0.732*** -0.715***
[0.168] [0.078] [0.021] [0.041]
Mail Order -0.108*** -0.042** -0.045** -0.061*
[0.014] [0.017] [0.018] [0.030]
Mail Order Status Unknown 0.027 -0.010 -0.045*** -0.260***
[0.024] [0.009] [0.001] [0.008]
Observations 43,341 718,427 260,667 139,243
Standard errors shown in brackets clustered by employer-plan: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification includes employer and time fixed effects.
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Table 2.9: Effect of Law on Physician and Patient DAW Indicators
Insurance Plan Type
Comp. PPO HMO POS
Effect on Physician DAW Indicators:
Chronic Sub-sample:
TN*POST -0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.001
[0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Observations 509,150 5,935,537 1,870,612 1,097,757
Non-chronic Sub-sample:
TN*POST 0.003 -0.001 0.006 -0.001
[0.008] [0.001] [0.005] [0.007]
Observations 43,341 718,427 260,667 139,243
Effect on Patient DAW Indicators:
Chronic Sub-sample:
TN*POST -0.002 -0.009*** -0.003 -0.009
[0.002] [0.001] [0.004] [0.006]
Observations 509,150 5,935,537 1,870,612 1,097,757
Non-chronic Sub-sample:
TN*POST 0.000 -0.003* -0.006 -0.007*
[0.005] [0.002] [0.007] [0.004]
Observations 43,341 718,427 260,667 139,243
Standard errors shown in brackets clustered by employer-plan: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specifications include employer and time fixed effects.
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Table 2.10: Comparison: With and Without DAW Indicators
Insurance Plan Type
Comp. PPO HMO POS
Chronic Sub-sample:
Basic Results:
TN*POST -0.003 -0.001 0.006** -0.000
[0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
No DAW Indicators:
TN*POST -0.000 0.007*** 0.007 0.008*
[0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004]
Non-chronic Sub-sample:
Basic Results:
TN*POST -0.007 0.005*** -0.005 0.014***
[0.006] [0.002] [0.005] [0.003]
No DAW Indicators:
TN*POST -0.000 0.006*** 0.007 0.008*
[0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004]
Standard errors shown in brackets clustered by employer-plan:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specifications include employer and time fixed effects.
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Table 2.11: LPM Estimates for Prozac and Fluoxetine Sub-
sample
Insurance Plan Type
Comp. PPO HMO POS
Basic Results Chronic Sub-sample:
TN*POST -0.003 -0.001 0.006** -0.000
[0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
Observations 509,150 5,935,537 1,870,612 1,097,757
Basic Results Prozac and Fluoxetine Sub-sample:
TN*POST 0.001 -0.000 0.011** -0.004
[0.005] [0.002] [0.004] [0.012]
Observations 7,888 96,366 33,136 17,380
Standard errors shown in brackets clustered by employer-plan:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specifications include employer and time fixed effects.
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Table 2.12: Sensitivity Analysis: Chronic Sub-sample
Insurance Plan Type
Comp. PPO HMO POS
Basic Results:
TN*POST -0.003 -0.001 0.006** -0.000
[0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
Falsification Test 1: Six Months Before Law:
TN*POST (Jan. 2005) 0.001 -0.001 -0.011 -0.001
[0.005] [0.006] [0.015] [0.005]
Falsification Test 2: Six Months After Law:
TN*POST (Dec. 2005) -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.007
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004]
Standard errors shown in brackets clustered by employer-plan:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specifications include employer and time fixed effects.
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Table 2.13: Sensitivity Analysis: Non-chronic subsample
Insurance Plan Type
Comp. PPO HMO POS
Basic Results:
TN*POST -0.007 0.005*** -0.005 0.014***
[0.006] [0.002] [0.005] [0.003]
Falsification Test 1: Six Months Before Law:
TN*POST (Jan. 2005) 0.005 0.001 -0.011 0.004
[0.008] [0.005] [0.014] [0.004]
Falsification Test 2: Six Months After Law:
TN*POST (Dec. 2005) -0.009 -0.001 -0.011 -0.000
[0.009] [0.003] [0.010] [0.004]
Standard errors shown in brackets clustered by employer-plan:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specifications include employer and time fixed effects.
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Table 2.14: Sensitivity Analysis: Effect on Average
Values
Sample
Chronic Non-chronic All
TN*POST 0.004 0.002 0.003
[0.004] [0.005] [0.003]
Pre Law -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.055***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.003]
AL Pre 0.002 -0.004 -0.001
[0.005] [0.006] [0.003]
AK Pre 0.017* 0.021* 0.019***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.003]
GA Pre -0.013 -0.010 -0.012***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.003]
Observations 8 8 16
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Chapter 3
Extending the Technology
Acceptance Model in Healthcare:
Identifying the Role of Trust and
Shared Information
3.1 Introduction
As the incentives authorized by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-
5) accelerate the adoption of electronic health records (EHRs) [Jha, DesRoches, Kralovec
and Joshi, 2010], health organizations continue to adopt integrated records shared by
multiple care providers. We expect that access to shared information and users’ trust of
this information will affect adoption and use of these integrated record systems.
Healthcare represents a unique industry, with employees (physicians and other health-
care staff, whom we refer to as ‘providers’ in the context of this paper) intimately vested
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in the outcome (patient health) of their service. Patient health is a complex outcome that
is affected by the services administered by multiple care providers, often in different care
settings. Integrated EHRs enable healthcare physicians and staff to share information be-
tween departments and practices within a health network. Multiple providers have access
to each patient’s records, which implies that updating and processing patient records is a
group responsibility. Because trust is a fundamental aspect of cooperative work [Herzum,
2002], we believe the extent to which employees will use the EHRs is a direct result of
their trust in the shared data within these systems. If the providers do not trust the data,
we expect they will find ways to work around the system, leading to inefficiencies and
unrealized benefits of implementation.
The proposed benefits of EHR implementation include: productivity growth; reduction
of medical errors; improvements in quality of care; and the increased ability to measure
and pay providers based on performance [Goldschmidt, 2005]. In the absence of inter-
operability, however, these expected benefits are likely to be stifled. Grimson, Grimson
and Hasselbring (2000) argue that the current inability to automatically share information
across systems presents a significant barrier to these potential improvements in care and
efficiency. We posit that access to information from various care practices within a health
network will directly influence the usefulness and degree to which physicians and admin-
istrative staff use the interoperable health information technology (HIT) system. Access
to, use, maintenance, and availability of a shared EHR are fundamental to the successful
implementation of these systems [Grimson et al., 2000].
The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is a common research method used to asses
the factors that influence the successful adoption of new technology. Researchers using
the TAM have found different relationships between its key components, which have often
been attributed to cultural differences [Yousafzai, Foxall and Pallister, 2007]. We believe
94
3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
that the healthcare industry has unique characteristics that influence these relationships.
Additionally, the TAM research finds different results in mandatory usage environments
versus voluntary adoption situations; the implementation of a shared EHR requires manda-
tory use of the system to achieve a basic level of effectiveness. This represents a departure
from the premise of the standard TAM, which operates differently under varying volitional
contexts [Brown, Massey, Montoya-Weiss and Burkman, 2002; Rawstorne, Jayasuriya and
Caputi, 2000].
The objective of our research is to extend the TAM in the healthcare environment,
particularly for the adoption of integrated health records that require providers to share
information. In subsequent sections, we present background on the literature related to the
TAM, its use in healthcare, and its application in environments where shared information
is critical. We propose an extension to the TAM in the conceptual model section. The
data and analyses follow. We offer conclusions and ideas for future research in the final
section of the paper.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Modeling Technology Acceptance
The TAM provides a general theoretical foundation for how users accept and use tech-
nology [Davis, 1989], highlighting the role of perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease
of use (PEOU) on attitude (ATT), behavioral intent (BI), and actual system usage. The
basic TAM is displayed in Figure 3.1. Additional factors that influence these variables have
been introduced over time in TAM2 [Venkatesh and Davis, 2000] and the UTAUT model
[Venkatash, Moffis, Davis and Davis, 2003]. For a complete review of the development of
the TAM models, please refer to Appendix B.
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In addition to these extended theories, many other studies have conducted expanded
analyses. In some instances, these studies validate TAM [Pai and Huang, 2011; Melas,
Zampetakis, Dimopoulou and Moustakis, 2010; Bhattacherjee and Hikmet, 2007; Venkatesh
and Davis, 2000], but in others the TAM findings are not supported [Yi, Jackson, Park and
Probst, 2006; Han, Carcillo, Venkataraman, Clark, Watson and Nguyen, 2005; Barker, Van
Schaik, Simpson and Corbett, 2003; Chismar and Wiley-Patton, 2002; Hu, Chau, Sheng
and Tam 1999]. In further cases, authors criticize the TAM for simplicity and lack of
contextualization [Holden and Karsh, 2010; Bagozzi, 2007].
Researchers using the TAM have found different relationships between PEOU-BI, PU-
BI, and PEOU-PU [Yosafzai et al., 2007]. Some research suggests that PEOU has only an
indirect effect on BI through PU [Davis, 1989; Adams, Nelson and Todd, 1992; Chau, 1996;
Gefen and Straub, 2000]. Other studies find PEOU to have a direct effect on BI, with a
magnitude that is equal to the effect of PU on BI [Adams et al., 1992; Agarwal and Prasad,
1997]. Further studies find PEOU to have a direct effect on BI that is larger than the effect
of PU on BI [Chau, 1996; Karahanna and Limayen, 2004]. One proposed explanation for
differences in the relationships is the voluntariness of adoption. In a mandatory setting,
researchers have found an increased effect of PEOU on BI, and a diminished direct effect
of PU on BI. Also, in mandatory contexts [Brown et al. 2002, Venkatash and Davis,
2000] PEOU and PU directly affect ATT, which subsequently influences BI [Brown et al.,
2002]. A second proposed explanation cites the importance of external factors over PEOU
and PU. In these studies, the influence of PEOU and PU on BI diminishes completely
when other external factors (e.g., perceived behavioral control and subjective norms) are
considered [Brown, et al. 2002; Lucas and Spitler, 1999].
Additionally, culture has been found to be a contributing factor to the applicability
of the TAM [Yousafzai et al., 2007]. Table 3.1 provides a brief snapshot of the types
96
3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
of conflicting results across employee groups and countries. The importance of culture
suggests that application in the healthcare industry, which has its own unique culture
(even across provider roles), may require specific contextualization.
Another contributing factor to the applicability of the TAM is the stage of technology
acceptance. Bhattacherjee (2001) highlights the importance of including the additional
factors of satisfaction and confirmation when analyzing cases involving continued systems
usage. However, when comparing the effectiveness of three distinct models (Expectation-
Confirmation (EC) Model, TAM, and an EC-TAM hybrid) in post-adoption situations,
Hong, Thong, and Tam (2006) find the TAM to be the most parsimonious. In post-
adoption settings, PU is found to have continued and significant effects on the use of
technology [Hong et al., 2006]. Further, Saeed and Abdinnour-Helm (2008) find infor-
mation quality and system integration to have significant effects on post-adoption usage.
Additionally, Al-maghrabi, Dennis, and Halliday (2009) find that PU, enjoyment, and
social norms influence post-adoption technology use.
3.2.2 Technology Acceptance in Healthcare
In studies analyzing the TAM in the healthcare industry, the inconsistent results iden-
tifying the relationship between PEOU and BI still exist [Holden and Karsh, 2010]. One
theory suggests that lack of exposure to IT systems may be consistent with non-significant
PEOU-ATT and PEOU-BI relationships [Barker et al., 2003; Van Schaik et al., 2002;
Duyck et al., 2008], but another suggests employee role could be the influencing factor
[Chau and Hu, 2002; Hu and Chau, 1999; Yi et al. 2006]. Of the seven studies with non-
significant relationships, six of them contained only physician samples, suggesting that
different factors influence the behavior among physicians as compared to other healthcare
workers [Holden and Karsh, 2010]. Some authors attribute the lack of significance of PEOU
to physicians’ increased intellect and ability to learn to use the EHR [Hu and Chau, 1999;
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Yi et al., 2006], while others find that physicians are not interested in usability, provided
the EHR is useful [Barker et al., 2003; Chismar and Wile-Patton, 2002].
More recent studies attempt to identify other external factors influencing PEOU and PU
in the healthcare industry. Melas et al. (2010) test external factors influencing physicians’
and nurses’ attitudes towards the use of general computer information systems (CISs)
for purposes of “storage, retrieval, sharing, and use of healthcare information, data, and
knowledge for communication and decision-making”. They determine that self-reported
measures related to information and communication technology understanding influence
PEOU and PU, but do not influence BI. Additionally, Melas et al. (2010) confirm findings
that healthcare professionals are more likely to adopt systems that they perceive to be
compatible with their current work processes, and also confirm the predictive pattern of
attitude to usage. Walter and Lopez (2008) find that perceived threat to autonomy has
a significant negative effect on PU and BI when considering the adoption of both clinical
decision support systems (CDSs) and electronic medical records systems (EMRs). Both
of these studies validate the use of the TAM in the healthcare industry.
Despite these positive findings and the determination of some external factors applicable
in this context, the existing studies have limitations. The findings of Walter and Lopez
(2008) consider pre-adopters, so these results cannot be generalized to other phases of
IT implementation. Additionally, the analysis considers only office-based practitioners
responding to general questions about CISs and EHRs, not specific systems [Walter and
Lopez, 2008]; this limitation is also present in Melas et al. (2010). Further, neither of
these studies considers the mandatory adoption environment.
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Holden and Karsh (2010) identify additional limitations of existing studies in this field.
Existing HIT studies capture the systems of telemedicine, picture archiving and com-
munication systems (PACS), and computerized provider order entry (CPOE); there is
a lack of findings related to EHRs and collaborative information systems. Further, the
existing studies identify PU in a broad context by defining it as follows: leading to the
enhancement of gains in job performance. In healthcare, usefulness may also be defined
in terms of efficacy, cost reduction, and improved quality and safety of care. Usefulness
could also be assessed from the point of view of various people involved in the care pro-
cess: physicians, specialists, patients, and family members. Current studies are not able
to distinguish between these varying aspects of usefulness, but these items may play a
particularly important and distinctive role in IT applications in the healthcare field. In
general, the existing studies focus on a limited and generic method of considering the
constructs of usefulness, perceived ease of use, and social influence. This could result in
overlooking constructs or important factors influencing user acceptance, and leaves many
opportunities for future research in the field [Holden and Karsh, 2010].
3.2.3 Technology Acceptance, Trust, and Shared Information
Because a shared EHR system involves user reliance on shared information across multi-
ple practices within a hospital, we expect trust will be an important factor influencing BI.
Trust has been most commonly analyzed in the technology acceptance of electronic com-
merce (e-commerce) systems and Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) systems; both cases
involve asymmetric information sharing, as would be present in the case of an EHR adop-
tion. In the case of technology acceptance of e-commerce systems, trust is of paramount
concern due to the risk that e-vendors might participate in harmful opportunistic behav-
iors, including: unfair pricing, conveying inaccurate information, or violating privacy laws
[Gefen et al., 2003]. During the EDI adoption process, trust increases the probability of
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greater EDI use. As more and more information is shared, higher levels of trust must be
attained amongst those who share and use the information [Hart and Saunders, 1997].
Trust is a significant factor in the TAM when considering the adoption of e-commerce
and in other contexts of sharing information across parties [Benamati, Fuller, Serve and
Baroudi, 2010; Gefen, Karahanna and Straub, 2003; Hart and Saunders, 1997]. Tan and
Thoen (2001) believe trust to be such an important component of e-commerce adoption
that they claim it to be the single factor contributing to e-commerce success. The few
studies incorporating trust into the TAM find that it has a statistically significant effect
on BI [Benamati et al., 2010], in addition to a significant effect on PU and PEOU [Gefen
et al., 2003]. Benemati et al. (2010) and Gefen et al. (2003) both find that the effect of
PEOU and PU on BI continues to be significant, even with the addition of trust in the
model. Although we do not expect physicians to engage in opportunistic behaviors, as
might be a concern in e-commerce or EDI transactions, risk is inherent in any situation
involving asymmetric information. In this case, medical staff become vulnerable to others’
mistakes or incompetence when relying upon information provided by outside sources;
this becomes a risky situation if medical staff then base care decisions on incomplete or
inaccurate information. The potential for these information asymmetries represent an
underlying factor requiring trust as a predecessor of use.
Analyses identifying access to shared information as a factor in the TAM are scarce.
In a review of TAM studies, Yousafzai et al. (2007) note that information quality (of
which information availability and accessibility are components) has been proposed to
affect PU. When analyzing adoption of online reputation systems, Komiak (2010) find
users’ perceived information quality to affect BI through PU; when considering the effects
of information quality on post adoption behavior, Saeed and Abdinnour-Helm (2008)
find significant effects of information quality on perceived usefulness and continuance of
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use. We seek to further extend this literature by identifying the influencing effect of the
accessibility and availability of shared information on adoption within healthcare systems.
3.3 Conceptual Model
We propose an extension to the TAM for the adoption of mandatory-shared EHRs by
introducing two additional factors to the model: trust (T) in the accuracy of the data;
and accessibility and availability of shared information (SI) coming from multiple units
within the health network. Figure 3.2 depicts our proposed model.
We define trust according to McAllister (1995): “trust is the extent to which a person
is confident in, and willing to act on the basis of, the words, actions, and decisions of an-
other.” In order to obtain the proposed benefits from this HIT implementation, physicians
and other healthcare workers must use the shared information regarding patient health
status to make clinical decisions. We propose that these healthcare providers will use the
information only if they trust it; therefore, trust influences the perceived usefulness of the
EHR.
Hertzum (2002) argues that trust is a fundamental aspect of cooperative work, and exists
whenever people exchange information. Trust is prominent in healthcare because it is a
team effort [Berwick, 2003], especially when we consider sharing information across EHRs.
Further, Paul and McDaniel (2004) find that physicians place a larger emphasis on trust
than on usefulness or ease of use in adoption decisions. We expect to find similar results
in the adoption of EHRs, and hypothesize that trust directly influences the perceived
usefulness of the system and individuals’ intention to use the system.
In order to determine the trustworthiness of shared data, the information must be
available and accessible. We define SI as relevant information from other departments
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that is maintained in the system in a timely manner, and is easily accessible from within
the system. O’Malley, Grossman, Choen, Kemper and Pham (2009) assess the effect
of EMRs on the coordination of patient care, and find the following factors necessary
for appropriate care across departments: timely exchange of relevant information, timely
communication between inpatient and outpatient settings, and ability to access necessary
information from the EHR. We expect that with more available, accessible, and timely
information, providers and other staff members will be more inclined to use the EHR for
patient care. Alternatively, medical and non-medical staff members may resort to working
around the system, and accessing patient information through other methods. Specifically,
if information is not readily available or current, providers may forgo use of the system
entirely, which could result in a negative relationship between SI and BI.
In industries outside of healthcare, the adoption of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)
systems began in the 1980s and 1990s as a means of gaining efficiency by connecting busi-
ness processes into one system [Murrell, 2001]. Palaniswamy and Frank (2000) identify
improved cross-functional integration as a critical success factor in implementation. Tarn
et al. (2002) further attribute the success of ERP systems to integrated flow of informa-
tion providing an invaluable tool in which all departments can coordinate activities and
communicate across a common interface. In healthcare, successful care of patients also
depends critically on providers’ ability to share information across specialties [Grimson et
al., 2000]. We therefore expect the availability of patient information from separate physi-
cian or hospital units to enhance the effectiveness and success of EHR implementations.
If users feel the EHR system increases their productivity and improves job performance
and effectiveness, their perceived usefulness of the system increases. It follows that the
availability, timeliness, and accuracy of the information within the system will affect the
perceived usefulness of the system.
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Building upon the basic TAM, in which PU and PEOU are the two distinct predecessors
of BI, we propose that SI will also affect BI and PU. In contexts of mandatory adoption,
past research indicates outside factors may have a greater effect on BI than PU and
PEOU [Brown et al., 2002]. As discussed in the literature review, prior studies have also
found constructs capturing various components of information quality, accessibility, and
availability to influence usefulness and usage [Saeed et al., 2008; Komiak et al., 2010].
3.4 Data and Setting
We analyze a Pennsylvania health network currently implementing a shared EHR sys-
tem. All physician-owned ambulatory practices in this network are implementing the same
system, which has shared EHRs for patients receiving care across specialties. We focus
specifically on adoption within the four obstetrics (OB) ambulatory practices. These prac-
tices share information across care settings within the hospital system, and one location,
in particular, sees bi-directional data flow between the ambulatory and the hospital labor
and delivery unit. This data includes the triage subunit where patients are evaluated for
admission. We survey physicians and office staff to capture details about their attitudes
and experiences with the adoption of these systems.
The questions we use to analyze our proposed model are listed in Table 3.2. We use
questions validated in past studies of the TAM, information systems, and psychology
[Pai and Huang, 2011; Bhattacherjee and Hikmet, 2007; Gefen et al., 2003]. In order
to capture the complexities of this industry, we formulate the questions to be specific
to healthcare, when appropriate. All responses are scored on a five-point Likert scale:
1–disagree strongly, 2–disagree slightly, 3–neutral, 4–agree slightly, and 5–agree strongly.
103
CHAPTER 3. TAM
We have survey responses for 123 employees during this round of the study. We dropped
21 observations due to missing user identification, which prevented us from gathering
demographic information for those responses, 10 observations because of missing clinical
indication, and 17 observations due to missing age and experience data; our final sample
contains 75 complete records.
Summary statistics regarding our final sample are detailed in Table 3.3. Research in-
dicates that physicians may interact with new technology differently than administrative
staff. Hu, Chau, Sheng, and Tam (1999) consistently find that physicians differ from other
types of users when accepting technology, specifically in the area of telemedicine. These
differences can be attributed to their specialized training, autonomous practices, and pro-
fessional work environments [Walter and Lopez, 2008]. Because of our limited physician
sample size, we conduct our analysis at the clinical vs. non-clinical level. Clinical em-
ployees are those actively providing medical treatment to patients, while non-clinical staff
would include receptionists, billing specialists, and administrators who do not directly
provide medical care. Non-clinical staff often have more experience using IT systems in
the office, as they normally conduct billing and scheduling through specialized software
systems; Barker et al. (2003) find prior levels of IT usage to influence adoption behavior,
so this difference could influence non-clinical providers’ acceptance of a new EHR in a
different manner than clinical staff members. Additionally, Yi et al. (2006) and Math-
ieson (1991) posit that medical providers may behave differently in the presence of EHRs
because of the availability of support staff to deal with the system on their behalf.
Our clinical sample contains 9 physicians and 19 clinical staff members (i.e., physician’s
assistants and nursing staff), for a total sample size of 28; our non-clinical sample contains
47 non-clinical staff members (i.e., administrative staff). The average age of our clinical
sample is 46, with an average of 18 years of experience. This represents a distinction
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compared to our non-clinical sample, which has an average age of 40 and an average of
14 years of experience. Our clinical sample is 85% female, while our non-clinical sample
contains all female observations.
3.5 Data Analyses and Discussion
We begin our factor analysis by validating the general fit of the data, which is 0.8246.
This corresponds to a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) rating of ‘meritorious’, which is well-
above the 0.6 minimum threshold. Additionally, we review the individual Measures of
Sampling Adequacy (MSA) to ensure that specific variables will not compromise the overall
fit of the data. Due to a low MSA value (under 0.5), we dropped question T3 from our
analysis. Further, we dropped SI5 and T4 due to low alphas; we also removed question
PEOU3 from our analysis because it loaded on two factors.
We use the remaining 17 questions to conduct our analysis. Using principal component
factor analysis, five factors result with an eigenvalue greater than one. We validate the
internal reliability of the factors by calculating each Cronbach’s alpha. The SI, PEOU,
and BI factors score above 0.80, corresponding to a good internal consistency. The alpha
for the PU factor is above 0.9, representing excellent internal consistency. The T factor
alpha score is lowest at 0.61; although it meets the minimum required level to remain in
the model, we also analyze a second metric, its inter-item correlation, to further verify the
factor’s internal consistency. According to Briggs and Cheek (1986), the optimal inter-
item correlation is between 0.2 and 0.4; Clark and Watson (1995) recommend this value to
be between 0.15 and 0.5. The inter-item correlation for our T factor falls precisely within
both ranges at 0.33. Based on this additional validation, we feel confident continuing with
all five factors in the model; we show the final factor loadings in Table 3.4.
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As noted in the literature review and data sections, the importance of cultural differ-
ences, social norms, and previous exposure to IT influences technology acceptance [Holden
and Karsh, 2010]. In order to account for this distinction in our model, we conduct sep-
arate path analyses by clinical and non-clinical designation. Figure 3.3 shows our path
analysis results for the clinical sample and Figure 3.4 shows the results for the non-clinical
sample.
In the clinical sample, we find PEOU directly affects PU in a positive and statistically
significant manner, while SI has a significantly negative effect on PU. Additionally, T has
a positive and significant effect on BI, while there is no statistically significant effect of
PU or PEOU on BI.
The positive effect of PEOU on PU is consistent with prior research [Benemati and
Rajkumar 2002; Lowry 2002; Lucas and Spitler 2000]. The lack of effect of PEOU and PU
on BI may initially seem surprising and appear inconsistent with standard TAM research;
however, some previous studies find no significant effect of PEOU or PU on BI [Holden
and Karsh, 2010; Duyck et al., 2008; Bhattacherjee and Hikmet, 2007; Yi, et al., 2006;
Han et al., 2005; Barker, et al. 2003; Brown et al. 2002; Chismar and Wiley 2002; Van
Schaik et al., 2002; Dishaw and Strong, 1999; Lucas and Spitler, 1999; Jackson, et al.,
1997; Subramanian, 1994]. Brown et al. (2002) do not find either PEOU or PU to be
a significant factor leading to adoption in mandatory adoption situations, especially in
situations where the system is integrated across users. As interoperability is a principal
component of the EHR system we analyze, it is unsurprising to find a lack of significant
effects between PEOU and PU on BI. In the studies finding no relationship between
PEOU and BI, the authors identify outside factors that have a more significant effect on
BI. Bhattacherjee and Hikmet (2007) study physician adoption of a CPOE system and find
that resistance to change affects BI; Brown et al. (2002) find that perceived behavioral
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control and subject norms influence BI. Our findings are similar in that we also identify
an outside factor, trust, to have a significant effect on BI while PU and PEOU are not
significant.
Paul and McDaniel (2004) find that physicians place a larger emphasis on trust than on
usefulness or ease of use in adoption decisions. Our finding that identifies the positive and
significant effect of trust on BI supports this consensus. Similarly, within e-commerce sys-
tems, Tan and Thoen (2001) find trust to be the single factor contributing to e-commerce
success. Our findings continue to emphasize the importance of trust when information
sharing occurs.
An additional significant finding in our model is the negative effect of SI on PU. We
believe this result highlights an interesting aspect of technology adoption in healthcare:
We interpret the negative coefficient as indicating that decreased amounts of SI increase
the perceived usefulness of this EHR. This may imply resistance among users to sharing
information and its access across practices and practitioners. This resistance may further
limit the timeliness, completeness, and accessibility of the records, reducing the perceived
usefulness of the technology. As determined by O’Malley et al. (2009), these factors would
be necessary for EMRs to have effective coordination of care.
Evidence of the negative impact of sharing information across practices emerged from
interviews with providers. When questioned regarding the problems encountered during
EHR implementation, many providers discussed their resistance to relying upon shared
data, and lack of trust in the information that exists within the system. As one individual
states, “... you can’t assume that what’s there [in the EHR] is always accurate ... I feel
like I have to confirm things more [often].” Other individuals’ distrust in the data is so
absolute, they display severe reluctance to use it, as evidenced by this statement: “ ... you
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should never just depend on what somebody six months ago wrote in the computer ... you
have to confirm it with the patient.”
In addition to capturing potential user resistance, the negative effect of SI may be a result
of information overload. According to Schultze and Vandenbosch (1998), information
overload is the “state in which the volume and speed of incoming stimuli with which an
individual has to cope is beyond his or her processing capacity”, or more simply stated,
as “receiving too much information” [Eppler and Mengis, 2004]. Information overload
can counteract potential gains from IT systems’ usage [Edmunds and Morris, 2000] and
decrease the likeliness to use a system [Farhoomand and Drury, 2002]. Wild, Laumer
and Kroenke (2012) find information overload to lead to confusion, stress, tension, and
anxiety, which can cause individuals to protect themselves by avoiding further information.
In the presence of information overload, MacDonald et al. (2011) similarly find people
avoiding certain information channels and ending searches before gathering all relevant
information. If this occurs within the adoption of EHR systems, users may find increasing
levels of information to decrease the perceived usefulness of the system due to information
overload. This could lead users to work around the system, and prevent the beneficial
effects of EHR adoption from being achieved.
Data gleaned from our interviews support this finding, as well; many providers appear
overwhelmed by the volume and detail of data within the EHR, and have not developed
the necessary skills to sort through it in a timely manner. As one provider explains his
or her experience, “It’s very frustrating as a clinician to data mine ... it’s gotten worse
because every single practice in [the hospital network] is on [the EHR].” Some providers
become so frustrated trying to access the appropriate data that they find methods to work
around the system: “I would like to lean on the system some more, but ... it would take
me more time than just asking the patient, so I just ask the patient.” Others find “it’s
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harder with the EHR to get that comprehensive, quick look,” and they are “wasting time
trying to find data.” These anecdotes provide some supporting evidence that information
overload could be a factor contributing to the negative effect of SI on BI.
In the non-clinical sample, we continue to see the negative relationship between SI and
PU, but we find no additional significant pathways influencing either PU or BI for this
sub-sample. We believe information overload could be a significant barrier to PU for
non-clinical staff as well as clinical staff, and note similar feelings regarding information
overload amongst clinical and non-clinical staff from our in-person interviews. The non-
clinical staff has been using electronic record-keeping for administrative purposes prior to
the implementation of this EHR; therefore, they may be more comfortable with electronic
data flow, and may not be affected on a daily basis by the interoperability of clinical
data flowing between departments. For these reasons, it is unsurprising that we do not
find factors influencing their behavioral intention to use the system. They may have
pre-determined adoption patterns from past usage of administrative systems.
3.6 Conclusions and Future Research
We posit that the unique aspects of the healthcare industry need to be included in
the TAM when it is applied to health information systems adoption. We include trust
and shared information as important factors in the adoption and use of integrated EHRs.
Our work extends the literature by providing a contextualized model of the TAM suitable
for application in cases of integrated healthcare systems, specifically concerning systems
with shared information. Our model provides improved insight into the specific behaviors
and attitudes that influence intention and subsequent adoption of HIT. We conduct our
analyses using the introduction of a specific EHR system at a large health network in Penn-
sylvania, so our analyses provide insight into users’ actual perceptions during the adoption
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process, as opposed to their hypothetical perception of a to-be-adopted technology. Ad-
ditionally, we test our contextualized and extended TAM in a mandatory environment,
further expanding the literature in the mandatory-adoption situation.
We find evidence for the importance of trust on the behavioral intent associated with
HIT adoption. Additionally, we find that shared information negatively influences the
perceived usefulness of a system. This brings attention to the importance of different
influencing factors in situations of shared electronic data, as is the case with this technology
adoption scenario. Our results also highlight differences between adoption perceptions of
clinical and non-clinical staff in the healthcare environment.
In the future, we are interested in analyzing adoption perceptions over time to determine
how they change at different phases of the adoption process. We believe our contextu-
alized model can provide additional insight into influencing behaviors of technological
adoption in the healthcare industry. Management can use this information to improve the
implementation process and acceptance of HIT.
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Figure 3.1: Basic TAM
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Table
3.2:
Survey
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Clinical Non-Clinical
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Physician 0.321 0.476 0 0
Non-Physician Provider 0.679 0.476 0 0
Non-Physician Staff 0 0 1 0
Location 1 0.571 0.504 0.596 0.496
Location 2 0.357 0.488 0.404 0.496
Age 46.357 10.612 39.872 13.33
Experience 18.089 12.335 13.872 10.533
SI1 3.321 0.983 3.298 0.689
SI2 3.5 1.036 3.34 0.891
SI3 3.393 0.916 3.128 0.824
SI4 3 0.861 2.936 0.791
PEOU1 3.679 0.905 4.106 0.814
PEOU2 3.893 0.832 4.021 0.794
PEOU4 3.5 1.291 3.872 0.947
T1 4.036 0.881 4.404 0.712
T2 4.321 0.548 4.17 0.94
PU1 3.643 1.254 4.021 0.675
PU2 4.107 0.786 4.319 0.594
PU3 3.857 0.97 4.085 0.717
PU4 3.857 1.079 4.149 0.691
BI1 4.179 0.772 4 0.834
BI2 4.107 0.786 3.894 0.84
BI3 4.036 0.838 3.894 0.84
Observations 28 47
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Table 3.4: Factor Loadings
Question ID Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
PU 1 0.8256
PU 2 0.8241
PU 3 0.8829
PU 4 0.8791
SI 1 0.8249
SI 2 0.8938
SI 3 0.9207
SI 4 0.7186
PEOU 1 0.8619
PEOU 2 0.7825
PEOU 4 0.6925
BI 1 0.633
BI 2 0.8801
BI 3 0.8887
T 1 0.6183
T 2 0.9128
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Figure 3.2: Proposed Model
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Figure 3.3: Clinical Path Regression Results
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Figure 3.4: Non-clinical Path Regression Results
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Table A.1: LPM Regression Estimates for Prozac 30-day Scripts
Switch Within One Month
Comp. and PPO HMO and POS All Plans
OOP CD 0.02 0.0578** 0.037**
[0.019] [0.022] [0.018]
TPP CD -0.047*** -0.035*** -0.037***
[0.008] [0.010] [0.008]
AWP Prozac 0.001*** 0.043*** 0.002**
[0.000] [0.009] [0.001]
Age Between 18-34 0.069*** 0.044** 0.060***
[0.018] [0.019] [0.015]
Age Between 35-44 0.056*** 0.051** 0.057***
[0.015] [0.021] [0.013]
Age Between 45-54 0.052*** 0.056** 0.056***
[0.017] [0.023] [0.014]
Age Over 55 0.058*** 0.054** 0.059***
[0.015] [0.022] [0.014]
Male 0.002 0.012** 0.006
[0.008] [0.005] [0.006]
MSA Population (100,000s) 0.000* 0.000 0.000*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Employer Enrollment 0.002*** -0.002* 0.002***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
MSA Per Capita Income (1000s) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
No MSA Indicator -0.063* -0.061 -0.062**
[0.032] [0.038] [0.024]
Northeast -0.025 -0.040*** -0.032***
[0.021] [0.013] [0.011]
North Central -0.015 0.002 -0.012
[0.019] [0.011] [0.010]
South 0.000 -0.018 -0.012
[0.013] [0.011] [0.008]
Union 0.006 0.002 0.007
[0.009] [0.011] [0.007]
Union Status Unknown -0.032 -0.010 -0.005
[0.026] [0.010] [0.009]
Standard errors shown in brackets clustered by employer-plan: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.1: LPM Regression Estimates for Prozac 30-day Scripts (continued)
Switch Within One Month
Comp. and PPO HMO and POS All Plans
Active Full Time 0.008 -0.005 0.003
[0.014] [0.019] [0.012]
Active Part Time or Seasonal -0.082*** 0.021 0.007
[0.024] [0.022] [0.018]
Retiree -0.012 -0.003 -0.006
[0.022] [0.025] [0.016]
Manufacturing, Durable Goods 0.097** -0.062*** -0.039**
[0.036] [0.015] [0.018]
Manufacturing, Nondurable Goods 0.095*** -0.057*** -0.031
[0.031] [0.018] [0.025]
Transportation, Communication, Utilities -0.075* -0.008 -0.048
[0.042] [0.011] [0.032]
Other Industry 0.072** -0.044*** -0.030**
[0.033] [0.009] [0.015]
New Prescription 0.241*** 0.239*** 0.241***
[0.014] [0.061] [0.025]
Physician DAW -0.304*** -0.289*** -0.292***
[0.039] [0.029] [0.022]
Patient DAW -0.269*** -0.287*** -0.273***
[0.023] [0.025] [0.016]
Mail Order 0.053*** -0.074** 0.022
[0.017] [0.032] [0.019]
Mail Order Status Unknown -0.006 -0.043 -0.020
[0.023] [0.046] [0.019]
Mandatory Generic Substitution 0.015 0.021* 0.014*
[0.015] [0.011] [0.008]
Comprehensive 0.035** 0.021*
[0.013] [0.011]
HMO 0.021* 0.011
[0.012] [0.009]
POS -0.044** 0.017*
[0.020] [0.009]
Pos w/ Capitation 0.009
[0.011]
Observations 15,472 11,093 26,565
Standard errors shown in brackets clustered by employer-plan: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification includes employer and time fixed effects.
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Table A.2: LPM Regression Estimates for Zocor 30-day Scripts
Switch Within One Month
Comp. and PPO HMO and POS All Plans
OOP CD 0.001 0.000 0.002**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
TPP CD 0.001 0.001 0.002
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
AWP Zocor 0.004** 0.000 0.000
[0.002] [0.000] [0.000]
Age Between 18-34 -0.017 0.076*** 0.043
[0.067] [0.025] [0.031]
Age Between 35-44 -0.003 0.087*** 0.055*
[0.066] [0.029] [0.031]
Age Between 45-54 -0.010 0.085*** 0.051
[0.064] [0.030] [0.031]
Age Over 55 -0.015 0.087*** 0.049
[0.066] [0.030] [0.032]
Male -0.001 0.000 -0.000
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
MSA Population (100,000s) 0.000 0.000 -0.000**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Employer Enrollment 0.000*** -0.002* -0.000
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
MSA Per Capita Income (1000s) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
No MSA Indicator -0.024** -0.029 -0.034***
[0.013] [0.020] [0.009]
Northeast 0.007 0.005 0.008
[0.010] [0.013] [0.008]
North Central 0.012 0.010 0.012*
[0.007] [0.013] [0.006]
South 0.012* 0.012 0.012**
[0.006] [0.012] [0.006]
Urban -0.017** -0.016 -0.023***
[0.008] [0.017] [0.007]
Union -0.005 -0.011* -0.006
[0.005] [0.006] [0.004]
Union Status Unknown 0.000 0.025 -0.000
[0.018] [0.025] [0.014]
Standard errors shown in brackets clustered by employer-plan: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.2: LPM Regression Estimates for Zocor 30-day Scripts (continued)
Switch Within One Month
Comp. and PPO HMO and POS All Plans
Active Full Time -0.002 0.003 0.000
[0.006] [0.003] [0.003]
Active Part Time or Seasonal 0.009 0.014 0.009
[0.023] [0.013] [0.011]
Retiree 0.001 0.009 0.006
[0.007] [0.006] [0.004]
Manufacturing, Durable Goods -0.055 -0.023 -0.014
[0.039] [0.073] [0.024]
Manufacturing, Nondurable Goods -0.030*** 0.123 -0.025
[0.008] [0.088] [0.018]
Transportation, Communication, Utilities -0.059 -0.020 -0.008
[0.038] [0.065] [0.023]
Other Industry 0.002 -0.032 -0.004
[0.021] [0.064] [0.019]
New Prescription 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.047***
[0.003] [0.005] [0.003]
Physician DAW -0.045*** -0.024 -0.038**
[0.010] [0.025] [0.015]
Patient DAW -0.035*** -0.002 -0.018
[0.008] [0.025] [0.020]
Mail Order -0.017 -0.054*** -0.029**
[0.018] [0.020] [0.014]
Mail Order Status Unknown -0.031** 0.007 -0.011
[0.013] [0.013] [0.008]
Mandatory Generic Substitution -0.002 -0.006 -0.004
[0.005] [0.007] [0.004]
Comprehensive -0.006 -0.011*
[0.007] [0.006]
HMO 0.041*** -0.012*
[0.014] [0.007]
POS 0.050*** -0.001
[0.015] [0.006]
POS w/ Capitation -0.027**
[0.010]
Observations 27,244 21,102 48,681
Standard errors shown in brackets clustered by employer-plan: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification includes employer and time fixed effects.
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Table A.3: LPM Regression Estimates for Neurontin 30-day Scripts
Switch Within One Month
Comp. and PPO HMO and POS All Plans
OOP CD 0.002 -0.005 0.000
[0.005] [0.007] [0.004]
TPP CD -0.004** -0.009*** -0.006***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
AWP Prozac -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.021***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Age Between 18-34 0.079*** -0.016 0.039**
[0.017] [0.033] [0.018]
Age Between 35-44 0.077*** -0.001 0.043**
[0.019] [0.032] [0.018]
Age Between 45-54 0.082*** -0.008 0.044**
[0.018] [0.028] [0.017]
Age Over 55 0.078*** -0.020 0.038**
[0.018] [0.028] [0.017]
Male 0.007* 0.003 0.006*
[0.004] [0.006] [0.003]
MSA Population (100,000s) 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Employer Enrollment 0.000*** -0.002 0.000
[0.000] [0.002] [0.000]
MSA Per Capita Income (1000s) 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
No MSA Indicator -0.008* -0.004 -0.006
[0.005] [0.012] [0.004]
Northeast -0.014 -0.034 -0.015
[0.011] [0.033] [0.011]
North Central 0.008 -0.000 0.005
[0.009] [0.027] [0.008]
South 0.007 -0.010 0.005
[0.009] [0.030] [0.008]
Union -0.006 0.016 0.000
[0.010] [0.017] [0.009]
Union Status Unknown 0.056** -0.044 0.004
[0.028] [0.041] [0.027]
Standard errors shown in brackets clustered by employer-plan: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.3: LPM Regression Estimates for Neurontin 30-day Scripts (continued)
Switch Within One Month
Comp. and PPO HMO and POS All Plans
Active Full Time 0.008 -0.0008 0.005
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004]
Active Part Time or Seasonal 0.002 -0.054*** -0.038**
[0.052] [0.016] [0.018]
Retiree 0.015* -0.011 0.006
[0.008] [0.007] [0.006]
Manufacturing, Durable Goods -0.120* -0.276*** -0.265***
[0.072] [0.096] [0.094]
Manufacturing, Nondurable Goods 0.108 -0.249** -0.133
[0.285] [0.096] [0.142]
Transportation, Communication, Utilities -0.107 -0.303*** -0.273***
[0.070] [0.099] [0.099]
Other Industry -0.249*** -0.234** -0.244***
[0.014] [0.093] [0.084]
New Prescription 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.051***
[0.006] [0.008] [0.005]
Physician DAW -0.124*** -0.142*** -0.130***
[0.012] [0.013] [0.009]
Patient DAW -0.137*** -0.156*** -0.142***
[0.012] [0.010] [0.009]
Mail Order 0.043** 0.037 0.045***
[0.018] [0.027] [0.015]
Mail Order Status Unknown -0.023 0.045* 0.039
[0.034] [0.023] [0.023]
Mandatory Generic Substitution 0.003 0.006 0.001
[0.006] [0.012] [0.006]
Comprehensive 0.027*** 0.028***
[0.007] [0.008]
HMO 0.004 0.032**
[0.031] [0.014]
POS -0.009 0.009
[0.032] [0.010]
POS w/ Capitation 0.035*
[0.019]
Observations 18,393 8,122 26,564
Standard errors shown in brackets clustered by employer-plan: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification includes employer and time fixed effects.
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Appendix B
History of the Technology
Acceptance Model
The TAM is based on two theories from social psychology: the Theory of Reasoned
Action (TRA) [Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980] and the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB)
[Ajzen, 1991]. The TRA states that a person’s behavior is dependent on her attitude
and social norms. It further claims that a person’s intention to engage in a particular
behavior is a likely predictor of actual future behavior. Ajzen (1991) introduced the TPB
as an extension to the TRA in order to analyze behaviors in non-volitional contexts.
Ajzen added the component ‘perceived behavioral control’ to the TRA in order to create a
more robust model and account for those situations where intention does not fully predict
action. The TPB predicts behavioral intention to be a construct of attitude, social norms,
and perceived behavioral control [Ajzen, 1991]. The TRA and TPB provide a theoretical
foundation for the TAM.
In 1989, Davis developed the TAM, which provides a theoretical foundation for how
users accept and use technology. Davis highlights the two main pathways of perceived
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usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (PEOU) as those influencing the behavioral
intent (BI) to use a new technology. Davis (1989) defines PU as “the degree to which a
person believes that using a particular system would enhance his or her job performance,”
and PEOU as “the degree to which a person believes that using a particular system would
be free from effort.” The application of the TAM spread to a variety of settings over
its history, and during that time two major extensions were introduced: TAM2 and the
Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT). Each of these extensions
focus on identifying the influencing factors of PEOU and PU.
Venkatesh and Davis (2000) identify five additional factors influencing PU in the TAM2
model. These factors are subjective norm, image, job relevance, output quality, and
result demonstrability. Further, they identify two additional factors of voluntariness and
experience as potential influencing pathways on BI. They find that this model explains
up to 60%of the variance in PU, but do not offer any suggestions regarding external
factors influencing PEOU. Venkatesh and Davis (2000) apply this model to four different
industries and find relatively consistent results.
The UTAUT model incorporates ideas from TRA, TPB, TAM, and TAM2, among other
theories in psychology and sociology, to identify the influencing factors on actual usage. In
this model, three constructs influence BI: performance expectancy, effort expectancy, and
social influence. Facilitating conditions influence actual usage directly, and the UTAUT
model hypothesizes that gender, age, experience, and voluntariness of use have moder-
ating effects on all other variables in the model. Venkatesh et al. (2003) compare the
performance of UTAUT to TAM, TAM2, and other behavioral models, and determine
that the UTAUT performs exceedingly well and identifies up to 70% of the variance in
BI. However, there are some limitations in the study preventing the generalization of their
findings; Venkatesh et al. (2003) do not consider collaborative systems or e-commerce
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systems, nor does their analysis include implementation in the healthcare sector. Because
UTAUT is based on the TAM and other behavioral models, which do vary in consistency
across industries, we cannot expect the same performance of UTAUT in healthcare without
empirical support.
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Education
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